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“Though [w]e torture[] the English language, [w]e [have] never yet succeeded in 
forcing it to reveal its meaning.” J.B. Morton, British writer, 1893–1979 
INTRODUCTION 
Law is art.  This claim is hardly new, but its advocates 
assert it largely by analogizing law and literature.1  Of course, 
no one thinks that law and literature are identical.  The claim 
is rather that they enjoy a familial resemblance, with enough 
common attributes to make the analogy enlightening.  I 
propose a variation: theatre, not literature, is the comparison 
by which best to understand law as art.  The most 
illuminating analogy is not the judge as novel writer, reader, 
or literary interpreter, but rather the judge as actor—
specifically, the Shakespearean actor.  Before proceeding with 
a comparative illustration, I will first make some general 
observations about this analogy’s validity. 
At a high level of generality, two similarities between 
Shakespearean texts and statutory texts immediately present 
themselves.  First, Shakespearean texts as a general matter 
do not speak to the public directly.  I would hazard a guess 
that a large percentage of Americans do not encounter 
Shakespeare’s text beyond a brief, violent skirmish in the 
tenth or eleventh grade and perhaps again in college.2  
Thereafter, if one encounters Shakespearean text, it will be in 
a theatre or on film.  However, in theatre and film, unlike 
with a piece of literature, not every reader’s interpretation of 
Shakespeare is relevant.  The most relevant interpretation is 
that of the actor who has been trained and authorized (that is, 
cast in the part) to do the interpreting.  In other words, 
between the Shakespearean text and the audience an 
 
 1.  For example, James Boyd White argues as much in various books asserting 
that lawyers have much to learn from reading literature.  See generally JAMES BOYD 
WHITE, FROM EXPECTATION TO EXPERIENCE: ESSAYS ON LAW & LEGAL EDUCATION 
(1999); JAMES BOYD WHITE, THE LEGAL IMAGINATION (1985).  Ronald Dworkin 
compares the judge to a literary writer—one who writes a single chapter in an ongoing 
novel.  See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEX L. REV. 527, 540–46 (1982).  
Stanley Fish articulates reader response theories emphasizing the judge as reader—one 
whose interpretation is constituted by the community to which he belongs.  His thesis 
stated more broadly is that there is no meaning to the text prior to the reader’s 
interpretation.  See generally STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? (1980). 
 2.  My speculation is based on four years I spent touring the country performing 
Shakespearean plays and teaching workshops on Shakespearean texts to adults, college 
students, and students ranging from the fourth to the twelfth grade. 
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intermediary stands to interpret and communicate meaning. 
The law—specifically, statutes—as a general matter also 
does not speak to the public directly.  As with Shakespeare, 
most members of the public do not read statutes and those 
who try probably find them just as impenetrable.  Statutes 
thus speak first to lawyers and judges and, through them, as 
intermediaries to the parties concerned. Without the 
interpretive mouthpiece of professional legal actors, statutes 
do not reach the public.  The written law clearly exists and 
may or may not influence those intended to be regulated.  
However, with both statutes and Shakespeare, until 
interpreted and communicated to the public, meaning, in 
some sense, will not exist3—at least, no fixed meaning will 
exist. 
Second, Shakespeare’s stories described the life of his era 
and are written in complex, often dense language—quite often 
Elizabethan/Jacobean-age verse.  Even his prose can be 
difficult to untangle.  Similarly, statutes are written to 
address the problems of a specific point in time and in the 
often densely-layered language of legislation.  Though 
specifically time-located, both texts continue their relevance 
in modern contexts despite the passage of decades or 
centuries.  The interpretive challenge in each case therefore 
requires modern speakers of ordinary English to decode the 
meaning of highly complex, often antiquated texts.4  Upon our 
first encounter with Shakespeare or statutes, we may 
understand the individual words and even individual 
sentences.  The meaning of the whole will likely elude us until 
we have read the text over and over again. 
To cope with these challenges, Shakespearean actors 
grappling with Elizabethan verse and legal actors grappling 
with intricate statutes learn tools and techniques to wrest 
 
 3.  See generally FISH, supra note 1. 
 4.  As John Barton says, “The two chief ingredients with which we start 
rehearsals are Shakespeare’s text and a group of modern actors who work mostly on 
modern plays.”  JOHN BARTON, PLAYING SHAKESPEARE: AN ACTOR’S GUIDE 6 (1984).  
Similarly, statutory interpretation begins with the statute’s text and lawyers who do 
not typically think or speak in legislative language.  Accord WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 10 (2d ed. 2006) [hereinafter “ESKRIDGE ET AL.”] (“The statute consists 
of words chosen by the legislature to bind citizenry.”).  Though hardly poetry, I take as 
understood that ordinary conversation does not always consist of legislative-like 
commands any more than it consists of rhyming couplets. 
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meaning from unwieldy texts and to communicate that 
meaning clearly to the public.  The tools help reveal what the 
authors may have intended the words to mean.  Before 
discussing more specific similarities, some large scale 
differences between the two interpretive endeavors are worth 
noting.  One significant difference is that because of the legal 
actor’s commitment to larger prescriptive principles, the legal 
actor often vigorously argues that one approach—and one 
approach alone—is valid as a method of tackling statutory 
interpretation.5  At an ideological level, legal actors may feel 
that one particular legal theory should dictate their 
interpretive posture.  For instance, a legal actor may feel 
compelled to shape his interpretation according to the rule of 
law theory, which requires “a law of rules that are predictably 
applied to everyone.”6  The legal actor who feels compelled by 
the democratic legitimacy theory, which suggests “that 
interpreters ought to defer to decisions made by the popularly 
elected legislators who enact statutes”7 may reach a different 
result.  Yet a third legal actor may believe the law’s 
legitimacy is best served by pragmatic theories, which suggest 
“that interpreters have an obligation to contribute 
productively to the statutory scheme and, perhaps ultimately, 
to the common good.”8 
Shakespearean actors, by contrast, generally do not feel 
themselves constrained by commitments to any particular 
theory of Shakespearean acting or interpretation.9  Though 
 
 5.  Compare STEVEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005) (arguing for a variety of tools to shed light on a statutory 
question), with ANTONIN SCALIA, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role 
of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER 
OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3, 14 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
(arguing for specific text-based method of interpretation). 
 6.   ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 220.  Justice Scalia believes that textualism 
is required by the rule of law.  See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 25. 
 7.   ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 220. 
 8.  Id.  I take this to be fundamental to Justice Breyer’s commitment to an 
emphasis on statutory purpose.  See BREYER, supra note 5, at 81–97.  But pragmatic 
arguments can be made in many theories of statutory interpretation.  Eskridge and 
Frickey note that Justice Scalia makes a pragmatic argument for hard textualism: that 
resort to legislative history is a waste of resources and carries too many risks.  
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 249; see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 29–37. 
 9.   To be fair, however, some Shakespearean actors are far more “purist” than 
others.  An actor’s commitment to Shakespearean text may in fact lead him to feel that 
more theatrical choices are not acceptable if not fully supported textually.  Antony Sher 
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the Shakespearean actor, like the legal actor, relies on an 
array of tools and techniques that illuminate shades of 
textual meaning, for the Shakespearean actor “[t]here are few 
absolute rules about playing Shakespeare, but many 
possibilities. . . . much of it is instinct and guesswork.”10  As 
John Barton notes, Shakespearean actors do not, generally, 
“believe that there’s only one way of tackling Shakespeare.  
That way madness lies.”11  Pragmatism is the legal theory 
that most closely aligns with a Shakespearean actor’s 
constraints: what will be actable and what will best 
contribute to the story on stage is the overriding 
consideration.12  Most serious Shakespearean actors, like legal 
actors, do share a deep commitment to the constraints of the 
text.13  For these actors, any choice made must either arise 
 
encountered some initial resistance to his highly theatrical (yet, I feel, textually 
supported) choices for Richard III from others in the cast on these grounds.  See 
ANTONY SHER, YEAR OF THE KING: AN ACTOR’S DIARY 181 (1986). 
 10.  BARTON, supra note 4, at 4.  Compare this statement with ESKRIDGE ET AL., 
supra note 4, at 9 (“If there is no simple, universally accepted approach to interpreting 
statutes, and if . . . the interpretive models competing for judicial acceptance are rooted 
in conflicting assumptions, there is ample room for the skill and imagination of the able 
practitioner.  Advocating a particular side in a close statutory case is an art, not a 
science.”). 
 11.  BARTON, supra note 4, at 4. 
 12.  To the degree that the rule of law emphasizes clarity as a component of 
legitimacy, there is a further parallel to be drawn.  Every actor performing Shakespeare 
concerns himself with making the text understood.  Though the legitimacy in the 
audience’s eyes of a performance clearly spoken is different than the legitimacy we 
speak of when we speak of law, the result is reasonably similar.  A law that says one 
thing but means another will be viewed as suspect (as will the interpreter asserting 
these cross-purposes).  Similarly, Shakespearean text suffers from interpretations that 
jar with the text.  As Barton says: “If we don’t reach our audience we fail.”  BARTON, 
supra note 4, at 5 (1984).  Not only does the interpreter lose our confidence, the 
audience comes away convinced that Shakespeare is impenetrable and therefore not 
worth their time. 
 13.  My own experience bears this out, as do many books discussing actors and 
their performances of Shakespearean parts.  See generally PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 6: 
ESSAYS IN THE PERFORMANCE OF SHAKESPEARE’S HISTORY PLAYS (Robert Smallwood ed. 
2007); PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 5: FURTHER ESSAYS IN SHAKESPEAREAN 
PERFORMANCE BY PLAYERS WITH THE ROYAL SHAKESPEARE COMPANY (Robert 
Smallwood ed. 2006); PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 4: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
SHAKESPEAREAN PERFORMANCE BY PLAYERS WITH THE ROYAL SHAKESPEARE COMPANY 
(Robert Smallwood ed. 2000); PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 3: FURTHER ESSAYS IN 
SHAKESPEAREAN PERFORMANCE BY PLAYERS WITH THE ROYAL SHAKESPEARE COMPANY 
(Russell Jackson & Robert Smallwood eds. 1994); CLAMOROUS VOICES: SHAKESPEARE’S 
WOMEN TODAY (Faith Evans ed. 1989); PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 2: FURTHER ESSAYS 
IN SHAKESPEAREAN PERFORMANCE BY PLAYERS WITH THE ROYAL SHAKESPEARE 
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from the text itself or find ample justification within it.  Put 
another way, choices must illuminate Shakespeare’s words 
and characters rather than simply impose arbitrary meaning 
from above. 
However, this difference between the interpretive 
endeavors, though not theoretically or ideologically 
insignificant, may not be as profound in actual practice.  In 
fact, as Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett note, in practice, 
“[m]ost judges are not single-minded theoreticians in 
statutory interpretation, but instead undertake a cumulative 
inquiry examining all possibilities. . . . The cumulative 
method also helps narrow the range of conflict in a case.”14  
This idea that the “cumulative method” leads to expanded 
possibilities of meaning that, in turn, yield a more narrow 
range of potentially “right” answers strikes me as brilliantly 
counter-intuitive; it also brings the two interpretive 
endeavors closer together.  Like the legal actor interpreting 
statutes, the “cumulative method” expands possibilities for 
the Shakespearean actor to consider and subsequently 
winnow to find the “best” solution to a textual conundrum.  
Thus, if Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett are correct, the 
process the legal actor undertakes to interpret statutes, in 
actual practice, looks similar to that of the Shakespearean 
actor: the commitment is essentially to the text—for all 
interpretation begins with the words on the page—with a 
pragmatic need driving the search for meaning and intent.15 
 
COMPANY (Russell Jackson & Robert Smallwood eds. 1989);.PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 
1: ESSAYS IN SHAKESPEAREAN PERFORMANCE BY TWELVE PLAYERS WITH THE ROYAL 
SHAKESPEARE COMPANY (Philip Brockbank ed. 1988); BARTON, supra note 4. 
 14.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 9. 
 15.  This observation leads to a large scale difference worth mentioning at the 
outset.  Theatre and acting in general is at its best when it looks easy; the audience 
should be unaware of all the sweat and hard work that has been invested.  Cf. BARTON, 
supra note 4, at 53 (“We don’t want them, as they’re sitting through a play, to be aware 
of all this work that we’ve done.”).  If, during the performance, the audience thinks 
about how hard the actor is working and not about the character’s story, then the actor 
has failed.  In other words, actors want the audience to focus on the result, not the 
process.  With statutory interpretation, the process is at least as important as the result 
and often more so.  For a good discussion of how process can be a proxy for fairness, see 
TOM R. TYLER, ROBERT J. BOECKMANN, HEATHER J. SMITH & YVEN J. HUO, SOCIAL 
JUSTICE IN A DIVERSE SOCIETY ch. 4 (1997); see also SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 25 
(“[T]he rule of law is about form. . . . We insist that before the state can punish [a] 
miscreant, it must conduct a full-dress criminal trial that results in a verdict of guilty.  
Is that not formalism?” (emphasis in original)). Seeing the interpreters’ work is thus 
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Two overriding themes characterize both interpretive 
endeavors, and both lead inevitably back to the primacy of the 
text itself.  The first is constraint.  The actor interpreting 
Shakespeare for performance is severely constrained.  A 
misconception of art is that it concerns the unfettered 
expression of the artist’s feelings.16  Not so.  For art to have 
meaning, structure must shape expression (whether that 
structure is apparent or not).  Structure implies constraint.  A 
sculptor is constrained by the material he sculpts; a musician 
is constrained by the notes on the page; actors are constrained 
by the words in the text.17  For the artist, channeling feeling 
or thought through these limitations creates meaning.18  The 
actor can play Mercutio as a drug-addicted transvestite and 
this approach may illuminate the Queen Mab speech in new 
and interesting ways.19  But if the rest of Mercutio’s text is not 
reconciled with this concept and if the needs of the play as a 
whole are not considered, the interpretation risks becoming 
detached from the text, and meaning and legitimacy may be 
lost.  Similarly, various constraints shape the meaning a 
Judge derives from statutory text.  The Constitution, the 
statute in question, past statutes, stare decisis, and other 
considerations establish boundaries that reign in a judge’s 
 
vital to the legitimacy and transparency of the law.  But see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 10 (2d ed. 2006) (pointing out that those immediately affected by the court’s 
decision may not care so much about how the case was decided, only whether they won 
or lost). 
 16.  Cf. WHITE, supra note 1, at 60 (noting that when talking of law and literature, 
some marginalize literature as concerned with “the sort of pleasure we refer to as 
aesthetic, with that word preceded, by implication at least, by a word like merely”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 17.  Stanley Fish makes a similar observation with respect to novel writing.  See 
Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 
TEX. L. REV. 551, 553 (1982) (“[An] author has surrendered his freedom . . . as soon as 
he commits himself to writing a novel . . . . because the very notion ‘beginning a novel’ 
exists only in the context of a set of practices that at once enable and limit the act of 
beginning.”).  Further, the actor is constrained—or at least his interpretation must be 
shaped—by the needs of the production as the director and designers have conceived it. 
 18.  Indeed, for the sophisticated craftsman, rules, limitations, constraints can be 
ultimately liberating.  That is why accomplished musicians do scales or simple vocal 
exercises every day and dancers spend many hours every week doing simple ballet 
bars—exercises that drill basic strength and flexibility.  Only when form and structure 
have been absorbed into the artist’s bones is the artist free to unleash expressive 
content. 
 19.  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, ROMEO AND JULIET act 1, sc. 4.  This was the 
approach of Baz Luhrmann’s 1996 film.  See ROMEO + JULIET (Bazmark Films 1996). 
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discretion.  Like the actor interpreting Mercutio, if the judge 
ignores these constraints, if the interpretation strains too 
much against the written word, the law risks losing its 
legitimacy.  Therefore, for both the actor and statutory 
interpreter, among the most significant constraints that 
shape meaning and interpretation is the text itself. 
The second overriding theme is ambiguity, an essential 
component of both Shakespearean and statutory 
interpretation.  Shakespearean text, spoken by the actor 
conveys far more than the text alone.  When an actor speaks 
with the character’s voice, he conceives of that voice 
communicating not merely the sense of the spoken words, but 
rather the entirety of his character—his feelings, thoughts, 
intentions, life circumstances—everything.  Because human 
beings are complex and often contradictory, ambiguity (to be 
distinguished from vagueness) is thus highly desirable, 
dramatic, and often necessary.  To aid the actor in this 
communication, Shakespeare often writes in verse.  Utilizing 
the multiple shades of meaning that words may convey, 
poetry amplifies the complexity of a character’s thought or 
relationship.20 
As with Shakespearean text, ambiguity is also often a 
statutory necessity, but for different reasons.  For one, the 
legislative process itself ensures that a single, controlling 
statutory meaning will often be elusive.  Edward H. Levi 
notes: “[Legislative] [a]greement is [often] possible only 
through escape to a higher level of discourse with greater 
ambiguity.  This is one element which makes compromise 
possible.”21  As legislators resort to higher levels of 
 
 20.  In Richard II, King Richard, who has been deposed by Bolingbroke, looks at 
himself in a hand mirror and then, sensing the opportunity for a dramatic gesture, 
throws it to the ground shattering it.  Regarding the shattered glass, he says to 
Bolingbroke: “Mark, silent King, the moral of this sport: / How soon my sorrow hath 
destroyed my face.”  Bolingbroke replies: “The shadow of your sorrow hath destroyed / 
the shadow of your face.”  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD II, act IV, sc. 1.  
Bolingbroke’s line can mean both that the reflection in the mirror was just a shadow of 
Richard’s face and sorrow, and that the unreality of Richard’s sorrow shattered the 
unreality of Richard’s face, that is, his public persona.  Also note that the imposition of 
a verse structure is yet another constraint placed on the Shakespearean actor.  As we 
shall see, an actor cannot speak blank verse the way he speaks prose and expect to 
communicate his character fully.  BARTON, supra note 4, at 151–52. 
 21.  EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 31 (1949); see also 
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 48 (1994) 
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abstraction, the statutory text increasingly resembles 
Shakespearean text insofar as it opens itself to a broader 
range of interpretations.  However, ambiguity can also result 
from carelessness on the part of the drafters or from the 
simple fact that the legislature, while setting out to address a 
specific problem, is unable to anticipate all the possible 
circumstances that may give rise to a statutory question. 
Embedded in the question of ambiguity lies one of the 
more important, yet telling differences between the 
Shakespearean and statutory text: ideally, statutes should 
mean only what they say.  Put another way, with 
Shakespearean interpretation, the goal is to uncover as much 
meaning as possible—to reveal ambiguity; in statutory 
interpretation, the goal is to isolate the only meaning—to 
eliminate ambiguity.22  What unites the Shakespearean and 
the legal actor’s job is that despite the fact that the 
Shakespearean actor embraces ambiguity, he must, 
somewhat paradoxically, strive for specificity.  In other words, 
although the Shakespearean actor may desire the audience to 
receive several shades of meaning from his dialogue, the actor 
himself must decide, like the legal actor, what the words 
specifically mean and what the character specifically intends 
when speaking them.  Ambiguity and its attendant challenges 
 
[hereinafter “ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC”] (noting that because statutes are aimed at big 
problems and are written to last a long time, they are written in general, abstract, and 
often theoretical terms).  If higher levels of abstraction are more likely to adapt to 
changing conditions, worth noting is that Shakespeare wrote about universal human 
needs, desires, and behavior in ways that have spoken to us across the centuries.  
Whether Shakespeare intended his plays to last as long as they have is, of course, 
impossible to know, but given his apparent obsession with death and the ability of the 
written word to confer immortality, supposing such an intent may not be unreasonable.  
See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, SONNETS 15, 18, 19, 55, 60, 63, 65, 74, 76, 81, 100, 
107. 
 22.  Cf. ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 61 (“[T]he agency or court is both 
interpreter and censor; it chooses one interpretation and suppresses others.”).  The 
doctrine of Chevron deference illustrates the law’s commitment to the paring away of 
possible interpretations.  See Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 
U.S. 837 (1984).  Chevron deference dictates that if Congress has not addressed a 
particular question with statutory clarity, the court will give deference to a permissible 
administrative construction of the statute rather than impose its own view of the 
matter.  Id. at 842–43.  However, if the court determines that the agency empowered to 
establish regulations has construed the statute in a manner plainly at odds with 
congressional intent, the court will give effect to what it believes to be Congress’s 
intention.  See id. at 843 n.9 (citations omitted).  One way or another, meaning becomes 
fixed and ambiguities dissolve. 
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are therefore a fundamental reality that must be dealt with in 
both Shakespearean and statutory interpretation.  The need 
to cope with ambiguity, once again, places the interpretive 
emphasis on text, but also introduces intent to the 
consideration. 
I will therefore emphasize textual and authorial intent as 
we turn to a more specific comparison of these two 
interpretive endeavors.  Again, what makes an actor’s 
interpretation a useful mirror to hold up to statutory 
interpretation is that the text speaks first to the actor, who 
then translates her interpretation to the audience.  Similarly, 
the statutory text speaks first to the judge (or lawyer arguing 
for a particular interpretation) who then translates her 
received interpretation to the parties at issue and to the 
public who will be on notice as to the text’s now-established 
meaning. 
For this discussion, I will consider the character’s intent 
parallel to a statute’s intent: both are derived from the text.  
Likewise, I will equate Shakespeare’s intent to the 
legislature’s intent: both communicate their intent through 
the text or other means to the actor who then communicates it 
to the audience or public.  The author and the interpreter are 
therefore partners (or at least both are required) in creating 
meaning.23  In summary, for my purposes, Shakespeare = the 
legislature, the actor = the judge/lawyer, the Shakespearean 
character/text = the statutory text, and the audience = the 
public.24  To aid the comparison and to illustrate this parallel 
 
 23.  Note that this is a position that a hard textualist would presumably not share.  
See, e.g., Scalia, supra note 5, at 17.  (“[I]t is simply incompatible with democratic 
government, or indeed, with fair government, to have the meaning of a law determined 
by what the lawgiver meant, rather than by what the lawgiver promulgated.”) 
 24.  Yet another high level similarity exists in this construct: the degree to which 
the public accepts the interpretation of both the legal and Shakespearean actor 
depends, in part, upon how persuasive the interpretation is.  A Shakespearean actor 
attempts to coordinate his choices seamlessly and consistently with the needs of the 
play as a whole and the production in which he finds himself. Similarly, a number of 
statutory canons suggest that interpretations should attempt to read statutes so as to 
create a seamless body of law.  See, e.g., Gade v. Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n., 505 
U.S. 88 (1992) (rule of avoiding inconsistency with the a necessary assumption of 
another provision); Eli Lilly & Co. v. Medtronic, Inc., 496 U.S. 661 (1990) (rule of 
avoiding inconsistency with the structure of a statute); California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 
490 (1990) (super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory precedents); 
Massachusetts v. Morash, 490 U.S. 107 (1989) (whole act rule); Green v. Bock Laundry, 
490 U.S. 504, 521 (1989) (rule of continuity); Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 
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more vividly, I will analyze and interpret a piece of 
Shakespearean text using the tools and theories of statutory 
interpretation. 
At the beginning of The Tempest, Caliban, an island 
creature of ambiguous origin, has been a slave to Prospero, a 
magician and the usurped Duke of Milan, who has been 
stranded on Caliban’s island for twelve years.  Prospero uses 
magic to create a storm—the titular tempest—that deposits 
onto the island the inhabitants of a ship—his brother (and 
usurping Duke of Milan), the King of Naples, and other 
members of both courts who conspired and succeeded in 
overthrowing him.  Following their arrival, Caliban meets a 
drunken butler (Stephano) and a court fool (Trinculo) while 
gathering wood for Prospero and, having never seen a human 
being other than Prospero and Prospero’s daughter Miranda, 
mistakes them for gods. Caliban solicits the help of these 
“gods” in a plot to murder Prospero.  At the end, the plot fails 
and Caliban realizes that the two in whom he has placed his 
hopes for revenge are merely human (and unremarkable ones 
at that).  The members of the court, who have never seen 
Caliban before, are startled by his “monstrous”25 appearance 
and Prospero and Caliban share the following exchange: 
PROSPERO 
[Speaking first to the members of the court about Caliban] 
He is as disproportion’d in his manners 
As in his shape. [To Caliban] Go, sirrah, to my cell; 
Take with you your companions; as you look 
To have my pardon, trim it handsomely. 
CALIBAN 
Ay, that I will; and I’ll be wise hereafter 
And seek for grace. What a thrice-double ass 
 
778 (1988) (plurality opinion of Scalia, J.) (rule against superfluity); United Sav. Ass’n. 
of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365 (1988) (rule of avoiding 
inconsistency with the policy of another provision).The idea of a “seamless body of law” 
is akin to a Shakespeare production’s attempt to create a world without glaring 
inconsistencies that will undermine an audience’s ability to suspend disbelief.  
However, the degree to which the public accepts the interpretation will be influenced 
also by each individual’s normative preferences.  Cf. infra, note 165 and accompanying 
text. 
 25.  I shall turn in more detail to the question of exactly what his appearance may 
be in Part III. 
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Was I, to take this drunkard for a god 
And worship this dull fool! 
PROSPERO 
Go to; away!26 
Just as a specific factual situation can focus the court’s 
attention on the meaning of a single statutory word,27 I will 
focus on the meaning of the word “grace” in Caliban’s line in 
order to understand exactly what Caliban intends regarding 
his future relationship with Prospero. 
Both Shakespearean and statutory interpretation may 
encompass three similar interpretive postures: textualism, 
intentionalism, and a dynamic assessment of textual and 
contextual factors.28  I will address each of these in turn.  Part 
I of this article examines textualism’s justifications and tools, 
and compares them with the tools and interpretive stance of 
the Shakespearean actor.  Part II compares the use of 
legislative history with the use of texts extant from the 
sixteenth and seventeenth century that can be useful to the 
Shakespearean actor.  Part III addresses dynamic concerns 
that might affect the interpretation of both statutes and 
Shakespeare, particularly changed circumstances.  The goal 
in all three parts to a greater or lesser degree is to uncover 
the meaning and intention of Caliban’s use of the word 
“grace.”  I conclude with some observations about the 
relevance of this illustration.  Let us first examine Caliban’s 
line through the lens of textualism. 
I: TEXTUALIST THEORIES AND CANONS 
The pure statutory textualist and the Shakespearean actor 
share a fiction: that something objectively discoverable exists 
in the text beyond the words themselves.29  In law, this 
 
 26.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 2 in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: 
THE COMPLETE WORKS (Alfred Harbage ed., Pelican 1969) (emphasis added).  Unless 
otherwise noted, all references to The Tempest will be to this version. 
 27.  See,e.g., McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 278–79 (1976) 
(deciding whether the word “race” in The Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1) includes white workers). 
 28.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 219. 
 29.  See Philip P. Frickey, On Statutory Interpretation: Faithful Interpretation, 73 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1085, 1087 (1995) (noting that textualists, as well as other theories, 
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textual fiction is akin to the pre-realist’s belief that the law is 
just “out there” and the judge is no more than a vessel 
channeling these objective truths.30  Similarly, the textualist 
merely reveals that which is inherent in the text if one only 
looks with enough care and has the proper training to find it.  
Although the Shakespearean actor has more discretion and 
freedom to impose an interpretation than the legal actor,31 the 
Shakespearean actor also proceeds with the belief that 
something of Shakespeare’s objective intent is discoverable.  
Thus, what John Barton says about Shakespeare could 
similarly be said about the textualist approach to statutes: 
“[T]he nature of the language tells us about the nature of the 
character [or statute], or maybe we should say the language is 
the character [or statute].”32 
Like the statutory textualist, the Shakespearean actor’s 
chief focus is the words themselves: the conditions 
surrounding their creation are far less important.  These 
words reveal the character, the relationships with other 
characters, intentions, and so forth.  Larger-scale 
considerations such as the design of the whole production, the 
setting, and the coherence of all the production’s disparate 
aspects have been pre-determined and are in someone else’s 
control.  Put more concretely, not only did the actor have 
nothing to do with the play’s authorship, but the actor rarely 
has anything to do with the directorial and design 
deliberations that led to setting The Tempest in the twenty-
first, the sixteenth, or some future century.  Similarly, 
 
“consider ‘text’ as having some component (i.e., conventional usage) potentially 
independent of the meaning intended by the speaker”).  To counter the notion that even 
textualism involves interpretive discretion, Justice Scalia notes that emphasis on the 
text is at least one step closer to democratic principles than the fiction that some 
objective, over-arching legislative intent is discoverable.  See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 
17. 
 30.  See Guarantee Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 101–02 (1945) 
(Frankfurter, J.) (“Law was conceived as a ‘brooding omnipresence’ of Reason, of which 
decisions were merely evidence and not themselves the controlling formulations.”); see 
also Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 
276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (rejecting the notion that there is 
some “transcendental body of law”). 
 31.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 285–86 (noting that when the Court 
“authoritatively construe[s] a federal statute, that precedent is not only entitled to the 
usual presumption of correctness suggested by . . . stare decisis, but it is supposed to be 
given a heightened stare decisis effect). 
 32.  BARTON, supra note 4, at 71 (emphasis in original). 
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textualism views the legal actor as unconcerned with the 
legislative deliberations out of which statutory text arose.  
The textualist’s focus is the text.33  The interpreter concerns 
himself with legislative intent only insofar as the statutory 
text reveals it.  The weaker emphasis on legislative intent34 is 
textualism’s effort to constrain the legal actor’s subjective 
discretion.  “It asks [the legal actor] to avoid invocation of 
vague or broad statutory purposes and instead to consider 
such purposes at ‘lower levels of generality.’”35  As a faithful 
agent of the text,36 the textualist interpreter is thus firmly 
rooted in a position similar to that of the Shakespearean 
actor. 
However, although the Shakespearean actor was not 
involved in the authorship of The Tempest and the legal actor 
did not author or vote to pass a statute, authorial intent in 
each case might still reveal layers of meaning relevant to the 
analysis.  The statutory textualist’s approach therefore breaks 
down further into the new, or hard textualist approach and 
the soft textualist approach. 
A. New Textualism 
For the new textualist, legislative history is off-limits.  
“[T]he new textualis[m] holds that the only . . . legitimate 
sources for this inquiry are text-based or -linked sources.”37  
Let us look at the justifications for this stance and compare 
them to the position of the Shakespearean actor.  New 
textualists, most notably Justice Scalia, have advanced two 
main constitutional arguments for their interpretive theory.  
First, consultation of legislative history is forbidden by Article 
1, Section 7 of the Constitution.38  Because a bill does not 
 
 33.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 231. 
 34.  As compared to those who look directly to legislative history to help determine 
intent.  See infra Part II; see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 231–45; SCALIA, 
supra note 5, at 3, 29–37.  Justice Scalia says: “We did not use to [consult legislative 
history], and we should do it no more.”  Id. at 37. 
 35.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 87 (citations omitted). 
 36.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 5 (using this characterization); cf. 
BARTON, supra note 4, at 53 (“Because Shakespeare is a great poet, an audience has as 
much right to expect us to be faithful to his text as they would to hear an orchestra play 
the right notes at the right time.”). 
 37.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 228; see also BARTON, supra note 4, at 71. 
 38.  See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 34–35; see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 
UFELMAN_CALIBAN’S GRACE 1/31/2013  5:21 PM 
2013] Caliban’s Grace 83 
 
become a statute until the Senate, the House, and the 
President have accepted it, only the agreed-upon statutory 
text is law.39  A committee member’s unwritten intentions are 
therefore ipso facto not law. A second constitutional argument 
is that textualism is most consistent with separation of 
powers.40  The power of legislating is non-delegable and no 
committee or judge may fill in the statutory gaps for 
Congress.41  Additionally, textualists argue that their theory 
advances the rule of law—the idea that people should have 
clear notice as to their rights and obligations; that the 
statutory text is connected to majority preferences; and that 
the text is the most reliable and specific evidence of legislative 
intent.42  Finally, a great deal of time and expense spent 
performing legislative research would be saved by both judges 
and lawyers, and “congressional deliberations could return to 
normal, unaffected by strategic plants of smoking guns that 
lobbyists hope to use in later interpretive battles.”43 
Although Justice Scalia’s constitutional arguments have 
no parallel in Shakespearean interpretation, the general 
impact his textualist efforts have had on focusing statutory 
interpretation on the text mirror the actor’s emphasis on text 
in interpretation. 
One point of agreement that has emerged from the critical 
literature [surrounding Justice Scalia’s attack on legislative 
history] is that neither citizens nor judges should consider 
legislative history to be authoritative in the same way the 
 
228. 
 39.  Interestingly, although Shakespeare was not under the same sorts of 
legislative pressures to form consensus, he was constrained in his intent by a public 
censor, The Master of the Revels, whose job it was to ensure that plays contained no 
offensive matter.  See Cyrus Hoy, The Original Texts, in WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE 
COMPLETE WORKS 41 (Alfred Harbage ed., 1969).  Without wishing to strain a point, 
Shakespeare could put on the stage what he and the Master of Revels could agree upon. 
 40.  See SCALIA, supra note 5, at 35. 
 41.  See id. at 35; see also Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692–94 
(1892); John F. Manning, Textualism as a Non-Delegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 
673 (1997).  But see BREYER, supra note 5, at 98–99 (“Legislation in a delegated 
democracy is meant to embody the people’s will . . . . an interpretation of a statute that 
tends to implement the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and is 
therefore consistent with the Constitution’s democratic purpose.”); Manning, supra at 
702–06 (noting the tension of the textualist claim with their use of extrinsic sources to 
discover meaning). 
 42.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 34. 
 43.  Id. at 237–38. 
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statutory text is authoritative: the latter is and has the force 
of law; the former is, at best, evidence of what the law 
means.44 
As with statutes, so with Shakespeare: text is the chief 
conduit for communicating the character and the play.45  
Learning about Shakespeare’s life and what he might have 
intended his lines to mean may shed light on the meaning of 
the text, but this inquiry is ultimately subordinate to the text 
the actor has to perform.46  As such, text is where the actor 
focuses the emphasis of his study and where he derives the 
majority of his clues for interpretation. Let us turn then to the 
textualist’s tools to analyze Caliban’s line. 
The starting point for all statutory interpretation, 
regardless of who is doing the interpreting, is the same: the 
plain meaning of the text.47  The plain meaning of the text 
controls unless it produces an absurd result48 or is the result 
of a scrivener’s error.49  With Caliban’s line, the plain 
meaning of the word “grace,” as understood by the man on the 
street,50 would likely be “beauty” or “charm.”51  However, 
 
 44.  Id. at 238 (emphasis in original). 
 45.  See SHER, supra note 9, at 203 (quoting Bill Alexander “The verse, breathing 
through you via the character to us, is in itself thrilling.  It is seventy-five per cent of 
what [the Royal Shakespeare Company] is about. . . . We’ve got to dazzle with 
Shakespeare’s language.”) 
 46.  Admittedly, this interpretive posture may be influenced, in part, by the fact 
that there is very little we know with absolute certainty about Shakespeare’s life.  See 
generally BILL BRYSON, SHAKESPEARE: THE WORLD AS STAGE (2007).  The dearth of 
information about what Shakespeare himself might have intended in his texts is 
explored further in Part II. 
 47.  See Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) (“In a 
statutory construction case, the beginning point must be the language of the statute, 
and when a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into the statute’s 
meaning, in all but the most extraordinary circumstance, is finished.”).  I have used 
Appendix 3 of ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 323–33 extensively throughout 
this part as a source for cases illustrating textual canons. 
 48.  See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 465–72 (1892) 
(holding that to find Congress intended to include the work of clergymen in the Alien 
Contract Labor Law’s definition of “labor” or “service,” 23 Stat. 332, would be an absurd 
result because of our history as a Christian nation). 
 49.  See, e.g., Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 511–24 (1989) 
(finding evidence that Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(1) which, on its face, would have 
excluded evidence of prior convictions in both criminal and civil cases was likely a 
scrivener’s error).  This decision is discussed in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 269–
71. 
 50.  Cf. Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 241–43 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(arguing for a definition of “use a gun” that, in context, would be understood by the 
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another rule of statutory interpretation is that the word 
should be read in context.52  Read in the context of the scene, 
the idea that Caliban hereafter will seek for “beauty” or 
“charm” is facially absurd and may be dismissed outright.  
Here, Caliban’s plot to murder Prospero has been revealed 
and Caliban is now at Prospero’s mercy.  The ordinary 
speaker might rather believe the line means something more 
like “seek for mercy” or “seek the favor of God.”53 
This text was written centuries ago and the meanings of 
words change over time.54  Therefore, the Shakespearean 
actor, like the hard textualist, turns to the equivalent of a 
contemporary dictionary to learn what meanings may have 
been lost to time and custom.55  For the Shakespearean actor, 
the primary source for the precise definition of words as 
Shakespeare used them is the Shakespeare Lexicon.56  The 
 
ordinary speaker of the language). 
 51.  See THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY 569 (2d Coll. ed. 1985) [hereinafter 
“DICTIONARY”]. 
 52.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. at 241 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It 
is . . . a fundamental principle of statutory construction (and, indeed, of language itself) 
that the meaning of a word cannot be determined in isolation, but must be drawn from 
the context in which it is used.”) (citations omitted). 
 53.  See DICTIONARY, supra note 51, at 579. 
 54.  See ESKRIDGE, ET AL., supra note 4, at 233–34 n.25 (discussing the evolving 
meaning of the word “discriminate” and its impact on our understanding of the plain 
meaning of Title VII’s use of the word).  Further, the meaning of the same word may 
have different resonances with different readers in the same time period.  A white 
man’s and a black man’s received meaning of the word “discriminate” would likely have 
been very different in the 1960’s and indeed, still today. Cf. id. at 252–53.  This insight 
is consistent with Stanley Fish’s notion of “interpretative communities.”  See generally 
FISH, supra note 1. 
 55.  See, e.g., Price v. Time, 416 F.3d 1327, 1338 (11th Cir. 2005) (looking at 
contemporaneous dictionaries and sources for the definition of “newspapers” as used in 
the statute as passed in 1935 to determine whether a magazine is a “newspaper”).  
Worth noting is that reliance on dictionaries often leads courts to argue over which 
dictionary is better, see, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 512 U.S. 218, 228 n.3 (1994) (arguing that 
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary accepts too much slang as proper 
English), and as others have noted, “dictionary definitions do not necessarily reflect the 
legislature’s intention in enacting statutes.”  2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND ON 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46:2 (6th ed. 2005).  Indeed, some 
commentators have asked, “[I]s this exercise in dictionary shopping and statute-parsing 
all we should be doing in statutory interpretation?  Does it threaten to reduce a complex 
normative art to a shell game or an exercise in cleverness?”  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra 
note 4, at 243. 
 56.  1 & 2 ALEXANDER SCHMIDT, SHAKESPEARE LEXICON AND QUOTATION 
DICTIONARY (Gregor Sarrazom ed., Dover Publications 3d ed. rev. & enlarged 1971) 
(1902).  While I was pursuing my M.F.A. in acting, I was taught that an actor should 
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Lexicon purports to define every word Shakespeare used and 
in every context that he used it as it would have been 
understood in late sixteenth/early seventeenth century 
England.  Here the actor finds that, as used at this point in 
The Tempest, “grace” means “blessed disposition of mind, 
virtue.”57  On the one hand, this definition accords with the 
notion that Caliban seeks forgiveness from Prospero. In 
seeking virtue rather than vengeance, he will earn the pardon 
of his master.  Seen another way, however, seeking for a 
blessed disposition of mind could also encompass the idea that 
Caliban must seek to forgive Prospero for the wrongs Caliban 
perceives have been done to him.58  Our initial textual 
analysis has therefore revealed an ambiguity in meaning that 
involves deciding whether Caliban is wholly penitent, or if the 
moment is more complex. 
To resolve this ambiguity, the hard textualist does not 
 
consult the Lexicon not only for the meanings of words that seemed ambiguous, but for 
every word he or she spoke.  According to my teacher, Theodore Swetz, Professor of 
Acting Performance, University of Missouri at Kansas City, until an actor explores 
every word, he never knows when he might come across a meaning that sheds 
unanticipated light on his character.  The level of detail at which an actor researches 
Shakespearean text seems therefore at least comparable to the level of detail at which 
the new textualist examines statutory text. 
 57.  1 ALEXANDER SCHMIDT, SHAKESPEARE LEXICON AND QUOTATION DICTIONARY 
489 (Gregor Sarrazom ed., Dover Publications 3d ed. rev. & enlarged 1971) (1902). 
 58.  The essential conflict between Caliban and Prospero lies in Caliban’s 
purported rape of Prospero’s daughter Miranda.  Long before the play begins, Prospero 
treated Caliban like a son, taught him language and other learning, and Caliban looked 
up to Prospero like a father.  When Miranda reached adolescence, Prospero caught 
Caliban trying to rape her.  Prospero chained Caliban outdoors and has been a harsh 
master ever since.  Miranda and Caliban both seem to subscribe to this version of the 
story.  However, considering Caliban’s perspective for a moment, Caliban was a free 
soul upon the island until Prospero showed up and claimed it for his own.  See THE 
TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 1, sc. 2.  As far as Caliban is concerned, unschooled and 
“natural” as he was, he may not have been doing anything wrong, only what comes 
naturally.  Considering Caliban’s “uncivilized” state, Prospero’s severe reaction, 
Miranda’s horror, and his subsequent shunning could have been deeply confusing.  
Thus, although Caliban now expresses glee at his attempted rape, given his current 
hatred of Prospero, he might simply subscribe to the rape story because he knows it will 
wound Prospero.  At the very least, the events that led to the current relationship may 
be more complex than appear on the surface.  Generally speaking, an audience gains 
little by questioning the truth of what a Shakespearean character says.  If they lie, they 
will usually tell you beforehand.  See, e.g., WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, OTHELLO (Iago); 
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, RICHARD III (Richard).  But as we shall see, changes in culture 
over time impose an obligation to read deeper into certain character’s motivations.  See 
infra, Part III. 
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turn to legislative history, but rather to a variety of textualist 
rules.  For instance, the whole act rule may offer insight or 
even resolve the question.  The whole act rule dictates that 
“[e]ach statutory provision should be read by reference to the 
whole act.”59  In other words, does the interpretation conflict 
with an overriding purpose of the statute or some other 
provision within it?  Similarly, the Shakespearean actor can 
look to see how his conflicting interpretations accord with the 
themes of the play as a whole.  Here, either choice for Caliban 
accords with a central theme of the whole play: choosing 
forgiveness over revenge.  Shakespeare evokes this theme in 
several storylines within The Tempest.  First, Prospero, the 
former Duke of Milan, was overthrown by his own brother 
who conspired with the King of Naples.  They plotted to kill 
him, but the kind (if weak-willed) Gonzalo saved Prospero and 
his baby daughter.  Twelve years later, Prospero brings the 
conspirators to his island with the aid of his magic, and holds 
in his power all those who tried to take (and nearly succeeded 
in taking) everything he had, including his life.  He spends 
the entire play bent on killing them all, but at the climax of 
the action, chooses instead to release and forgive them, 
difficult though that choice may be.  Second, the audience has 
seen Prospero at his worst in this play.  They have seen him 
act cruelly to both Ariel and Caliban, and they have seen him 
bent on the suffering and total destruction of at least three 
more people.  Shakespeare therefore has Prospero, in his final 
lines, ask the audience’s forgiveness.60  Thus, given the 
leitmotif of forgiveness (or as Prospero puts it, “virtue” over 
 
 59.  See, e.g., Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 233 (1993) (“A provision that 
may seem ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme—because the same terminology is used elsewhere in a context that makes its 
meaning clear, or because only one of the permissible meanings produces a substantive 
effect that is compatible with the rest of the law.”) (citations omitted).  The whole act 
rule is justified on legitimacy grounds: “A polity whose law knits together into a 
seamless fabric is one whose law enjoys greater authority than a polity whose statutory 
law appears largely random.”  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 272.  Similarly, though 
drama may embrace contradiction and inconsistency in human nature, the drama itself 
tends to play better when there is some coherence of theme throughout. 
 60.  “As you from crimes would pardoned be, / Let your indulgence set me free.”  
THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at Epilogue.  This line is the cue for the audience to 
applaud, and Shakespeare has written the epilogue to suggest that this applause 
signifies the audience’s forgiveness.: See id. (“[R]elease me from my bands / With the 
help of your good hands.”). 
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“vengeance”),61 Caliban’s seeking either Prospero’s forgiveness 
or seeking to forgive Prospero harmonizes with the whole 
play.62 
Another tool the hard textualist might invoke is the 
presumption of statutory consistency across different 
statutes.63  For example, in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of 
Communities for a Great Oregon, Justice Scalia, in dissent, 
interpreted the word “take” in Section 3(19) of the 
Endangered Species Act of 1973,64 consistently with Section 
703 of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act.65  Similarly, the 
Shakespearean actor might look to other plays or literary 
uses of the phrase to shed light on the question.  For example, 
Edmund Spenser, a Shakespeare contemporary, uses the 
phrase “seek for grace” to mean “sue for pardon.”66  This use, 
written in the same time period as Shakespeare, adds weight 
to the interpretation that Caliban seeks Prospero’s 
forgiveness.  Indeed, Shakespeare himself created similar 
situations in other plays where a character must choose 
revenge or forgiveness.67  For example, In The Merchant of 
Venice, Shylock finds himself in a position of power over 
Antonio, a man who long has been Shylock’s enemy, due to a 
contract that, on its face, allows Shylock to cut a pound of 
 
 61.  See id. at act 5, sc. 1 (“The rarer act is / In virtue than in vengeance.”) 
 62.  Other scholars note that Caliban’s presumed repentance contrasts with the 
other man in the play who attempted to kill Prospero before the play began: Antonio.  
ALDEN T. VAUGHAN & VIRGINIA MASON VAUGHAN, SHAKESPEARE’S CALIBAN: A 
CULTURAL HISTORY 19 (1993).  When Prospero forgives Antonio at the end, Antonio 
remains silent.  THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 5, sc. 1.  Thus, this structural 
contrast supports the idea of Caliban seeking forgiveness from Prospero. 
 63.  See, e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Oregon, 515 
U.S. 687, 717–18 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (interpreting the word “take” in § 3(19) 
of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1532(19) consistently with the 
Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 16 U.S.C. § 703 (1988 ed., Supp. V)). 
 64.  16 U.S.C. §§ 1532(19). 
 65.  16 U.S.C. § 703; Babbitt, 515 U.S. at 717–18 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 66.  See THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO ENGLISH RENAISSANCE DRAMA 124 (A.R. 
Braunmuller & Michael Hattaway eds. 2003). 
 67.  The rule of in pari materia suggests that “similar statutes should be 
interpreted similarly.”  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 327 (1994); see, e.g., 
Wimberly v. Labor and Indus. Relations Comm’n of Mo., 479 U.S. 511, 514–20 (1987) 
(comparing MO. REV. STAT. § 288.050.1(1) which disqualifies a claimant for 
unemployment benefits who leaves work voluntarily without good cause attributable to 
employment with the Federal Unemployment Tax Act, 26 U.S.C. § 3304(a)(12) and with 
other states’ unemployment statutes that do not have special provisions related to 
pregnancy). 
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Antonio’s flesh from a place nearest Antonio’s heart.68  How a 
character responds to the situation suggests how Shakespeare 
intended the audience to view that character.  Those who are 
not able to forgive are the subject of ridicule, or at least 
pathos.  Those who can forgive when every sinew cries out for 
revenge are ennobled.  Shakespeare’s handling of these 
similar situations lends support for the position that, having 
attempted revenge, Caliban now seeks an alternative: he will 
seek to forgive.69 
The hard textualist has other rules to resolve textual 
ambiguity, but to examine them alongside Shakespeare, we 
must divert our attention briefly from our specific look at 
Caliban’s line to a look at the similarities to Shakespearean 
textual interpretation in general.  In particular, let us look at 
canons of word association and rules of punctuation.  Neither 
is applicable to Caliban’s line,70 but contrasts and similarities 
to an actor’s approach to Shakespearean text exist that are 
worth examining.  With each canon, the main contrast to 
reemphasize is that in the statutory context, the rule narrows 
meaning to one thing, and in the Shakespearean context, the 
rules seek to uncover multiple meanings. 
Three canons of word association are relevant to our 
comparison: noscitur a sociis, ejusdem generis, and expressio 
unis. Noscitur a sociis, “a thing shall be known by its 
associates,” presumes that “when two or more words are 
grouped together, and ordinarily have similar meaning, but 
are not equally comprehensive, the general word will be 
limited and qualified by the special word.”71  Similarly 
 
 68.  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE act 4, sc. 1.  Shylock 
chooses revenge.  See also SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 5, sc. 1 (Isabella 
chooses forgiveness); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, TWELFTH NIGHT act 5, sc. 1 (Malvolio 
chooses revenge). 
 69.  That we might find a clue to Caliban’s intention by finding a posture 
antithetical to the one he expresses throughout the play has a pleasing symmetry with 
one of the key textual clues a Shakespearean actor looks for in the text generally.  
Antithesis crops up in Shakespearean text time and time again and is a marvelous tool 
for communicating meaning clearly to an audience.  See BARTON, supra note 4, at 66 (“If 
I were to offer one single bit of advice to an actor new to Shakespeare’s text, I suspect 
that the most useful thing I could say would be, ‘Look for the antithesis and play 
them.’”) (emphasis in original).  Indeed, Shakespeare’s most famous line of all expresses 
an antithetical thought: “To be or not to be , , , ,. . .” WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE 
TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK act 3, sc. 1. 
 70.  But see infra, Part III. 
 71.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 261 (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTES 
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ejusdem generis suggests “[w]here general words follow 
specific words in statutory enumeration, the general words 
are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature to 
those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.”72  
Expressio unius tells the statutory interpreter that the 
“expression of one thing suggests the exclusion of others.”73  
These three canons all suggest that words occurring in lists 
should be read to have a similar meaning, expanded either by 
noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis or limited by expressio 
unius.  The Shakespearean actor’s approach to lists of words 
presents a contrast to these word association canons.  Where 
the legal actor looks for similarity in the effort to limit or 
expand meaning by resort to a higher level of generality, the 
Shakespearean actor seeks to exploit and isolate fine 
distinctions.  Thus, when Queen Gertrude, in Hamlet, tells 
Laertes that his sister has drowned, she tells him that she 
wove herself “fantastic garlands . . . Of crowflowers, nettles, 
daisies, and long purples . . . .”74  When the actor speaks these 
lines, she must not think of all these generally as “flowers.”  
Each word in the list must be particular and distinct in the 
 
AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.16 at 183 (Norman Singer, ed., 5th ed. 1992)); see, 
e.g., Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 15 U.S. 687, 715 (1995) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the word “harm” used in the definition of “take” in 
§ 3(19) of the Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C.A. §§ 1532(19) should be read 
in light of the other, more specific words used in the statute: “harass . . . pursue, hunt, 
shoot, wound, kill, trap, capture, or collect”). 
 72.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 261–62  (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND, 
STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 at 188 (Norman Singer, ed., 5th ed. 
1992)); see, e.g., Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 417-19 (1990) (deciding what 
restitution may be permitted under 18 U.S.C. § 3579 (1982 ed., Supp. IV) and 
determining that the catchall phrase “such other factors as the court deems 
appropriate” in 18 U.S.C. § 3580(a) (1982 ed.) should not be read to introduce into the 
restitution calculus losses that would expand a defendant’s liability beyond the offense 
of conviction because the considerations enumerated immediately before, “the amount 
of the loss sustained by any victim as a result of the offense, the financial resources of 
the defendant, the financial needs and earning ability of the defendant and the 
defendant’s dependents” suggested such a limitation). 
 73.  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 323; see, e.g., Sullivan v. Hudson, 490 
U.S. 877, 895 (1989) (“Applying the maxim of statutory construction expressio unius est 
exclusio alterius, the express congressional authorization [in 5 U.S.C. § 504(a)(1) (1982 
ed., Supp. V)] for recovery of fees in adversary agency adjudications coupled with the 
lack of authorization for recovery of fees in nonadversary adjudications indicates 
Congress’ intent not to authorize recovery of fees in nonadversary agency 
adjudications.”) (White, J., dissenting). 
 74.  HAMLET, supra note 69, at act 4, sc. 7. 
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actor’s mind; a truly dedicated actor might go so far as to find 
these flowers in a field, hold them, smell them, and establish 
a strong visceral connection to them.  If the actor expects the 
audience to picture the scene clearly, she must paint it with a 
fine brush. 
Finally, basic grammar and punctuation rules help 
uncover meaning in both statutes and Shakespeare.75  In the 
statutory context, “[c]ourts presume that the legislature 
expects its statutes to be read according to the ordinary rules 
of grammar and punctuation.”76  The rule of the last 
antecedent tells the legal actor that “referential and 
qualifying words refer only to the last antecedent, unless 
contrary to the statute’s punctuation or policy.”77  For 
example, Commonwealth v. Kelly78  
construed a law prohibiting the sale of alcohol between eleven at 
night “and six in the morning; or during the Lord’s day, except that 
[an innholder] may supply such liquor to guests.” . . . The rule of 
the last antecedent suggested that the [innholder] proviso only 
modified “during the Lord’s day.”  Sometimes courts will relax the 
rule when the proviso is set off from a series of items by a comma, 
but the comma-trumping exception was itself trumped in this case 
by the semi-colon separating the two items.  That the legislature 
had specifically amended the statute to replace a comma with the 
semicolon was evidence strongly confirming the applicability of the 
rule of the last antecedent, the court ruled.79 
To the degree that punctuation and grammatical 
considerations deal with how textual construction 
communicates thought, similar considerations play important 
roles for the Shakespearean actor as well—specifically, 
punctuation and verse structure.80 
Turning back to Caliban, the hard textualist is probably 
finished.  The meaning of “grace” seems clearly to mean that 
 
 75.  A good example of how critical punctuation can be to an author’s meaning is 
the difference between: 1) “A woman, without her man, is nothing”; and 2) “A woman: 
without her, man is nothing.” 
 76.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 264–65. 
 77.  Id. at 266 (2d ed. 2006). 
 78.  58 N.E. 691 (Mass. 1900). 
 79.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 266. 
 80.  For a good example of how punctuation influences how an actor interprets 
Shakespeare’s text, see infra text and accompanying notes 199-201 (discussing how 
David Suchet’s investigation into the text’s punctuation helped lead him to a new 
interpretation of Caliban). 
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Caliban seeks Prospero’s forgiveness.  Whatever ambiguities 
may still exist after an analysis with textualist tools may 
surely be resolved by one final point.  Looking at the broader 
historical context, the Elizabethan world viewed a ruler as 
chosen by God.  As God’s chosen, the ruler is omnipotent and 
is “the sole dispenser of what is necessary for salvation.”81  To 
the Elizabethan man on the street, then, the very idea that 
“grace” could encompass the notion that Caliban would ever 
be in a position to forgive Prospero would be almost 
unspeakable.  Thus, the hard textualist’s conclusion has been 
buttressed by contemporary textual sources, by the historical 
context in which it is spoken, and is supported thematically 
by the play itself.  Shakespeare’s dramatic use of the 
forgiveness/revenge dynamic in other plays, if taken to 
support the opposite conclusion, would likely be outweighed 
for the new textualist by the historical context, which 
suggests Caliban could never be in a position to forgive his 
master.  In other words, interpreting Caliban as seeking to 
forgive Prospero would be statutorily akin to an absurd 
result.82 
For the Shakespearean actor, however, the inquiry is not 
at an end.  Nor would it necessarily be for statutory 
interpreters who do not consider text the only source of 
meaning.  Indeed, given the stakes involved in statutory 
construction, addressing the legislature’s intent more 
holistically is arguably desirable and focusing on text alone 
seems too restricting if we are to arrive at a fully considered 
interpretation of Caliban’s line. 
B. Soft Textualism 
As a general matter, the soft textualist’s approach is 
probably most closely aligned with that of the Shakespearean 
actor.  In both cases, the text is the most important 
consideration, but context and other considerations that 
provide clues to the intentions behind the text also might 
prove important.  Indeed, given how much Shakespeare has 
 
 81.  RENAISSANCE DRAMA, supra note 66, at 124.  Worth noting is that Prospero 
never explicitly pardons Caliban for his attempted murder. He only gives the conditions 
of salvation.  See THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 5, sc. 1. 
 82.  Cf. Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). 
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packed into his text, the Shakespearean actor would be a fool 
not to consider everything at his disposal to help him uncover 
the intent behind the words.  The soft textualist may not 
search as broadly as the Shakespearean actor, but 
nevertheless, the text’s plain meaning is not the end of the 
inquiry.83  The soft textualist is willing to look at legislative 
history. 
Let us look at some justifications for this approach and 
their parallels to Shakespearean interpretation.  First, soft 
textualism “might well be a tacit admission that the goal of 
the inquiry is intentionalist, and plain meaning is just one 
important source of information about legislative intent or 
purpose.”84  Similarly, for the Shakespearean actor, the text’s 
meaning is a means to discover intent.  Indeed, intent and 
meaning are intertwined and determining which comes first 
is difficult.  In our present situation, when we decide what 
Caliban intends toward Prospero, we will know what the word 
“grace” means.  However, we wouldn’t have the choice to 
make had we not investigated the possible meanings of the 
word.  Note the contrast to hard textualism: for the hard 
textualist, text determines intent and never the other way 
around. 
A second justification for soft textualism is that it “might 
be a concession to normative complexity.  If the rule of law 
requires interpreters to apply statutes to the letter, then 
sometimes the cost of ‘lawfulness’ will be too great.”85  In other 
words, if following the law to the letter leads people to act in 
ways that are clearly contrary to other, stronger, 
countervailing interests, those legal actors should not follow 
the letter of the law.  Compare this to Shakespeare.  The 
plain meaning of Kate’s final speech in The Taming of the 
Shrew86 can be read as an endorsement of man’s superiority 
over woman.  However, insisting the speech must be 
performed with that interpretation threatens to relegate the 
play to irrelevancy, when, in fact, richer interpretations 
 
 83.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 232–33 (“[T]he existence of an apparent 
plain meaning is not dispositive [for the soft textualist], because something deeper is 
going on when statutes are interpreted.”). 
 84.  Id. at 233. 
 85.  Id. 
 86.  See WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW, Act V, sc. ii [herein 
after “SHREW”]. 
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informed by twentieth century enlightenment exist.  Consider 
also the plain meaning of Hamlet’s speech, “To be, or not to 
be.”87  On its face, this speech is a solitary contemplation of 
suicide. However, a look at the circumstances in the scene 
reveals another possibility.  Claudius and Polonius are spying 
on Hamlet as he speaks.  A critical choice for the actor playing 
Hamlet to make is whether he knows they are there.  If he 
does, Hamlet’s speech is a show Hamlet performs as part of 
his “antic disposition.”88  Such a choice will drastically change 
the interpretation of the speech. 
Finally, soft textualism “might be a statement about plain 
meaning itself: you cannot be sure the meaning is so plain 
unless you consider the legislative deliberations and the 
practical consequences.”89  Indeed, a criticism leveled at new 
textualism is that it may actually sever the connection 
between democracy and the rule of law.  The argument goes 
that Congress sought to solve a particular problem and that 
should make an interpretive difference.90  As Justice Breyer 
said: “[O]veremphasis on text can lead courts astray, 
divorcing law from life, . . . creating law that harms those 
whom Congress meant to help.”91 
Justice Breyer’s idea that the interpretation of statutes 
should be connected to life is similar to the theatrical art in 
general. Theatre and acting are meant to “hold, as ‘twere, the 
mirror up to nature”92—that is, to reflect real life and human 
experience.  A distinction, perhaps, may be made between 
these connections to life in that Shakespeare intends to reflect 
human behavior, whereas the law intends to regulate human 
behavior.  However, this is all the more reason why the law 
should not be divorced from life and human experience any 
more than Shakespeare’s text.  If the judge is to connect the 
statutory text to the behavior intended to be regulated, the 
text and its authors’ intent ought to be closely aligned.  If the 
actor is to connect the Shakespearean text to human 
behavior, on the other hand, so direct an alignment between 
 
 87.  See HAMLET, supra note 69, at act 3, sc. 1. 
 88.  See id. at act I, sc. v. 
 89.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 233. 
 90.  Id. at 243. 
 91.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 85. 
 92.  HAMLET, supra note 69, at act 3, sc. 2. 
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text and authorial intention is not always necessary.93  
Rather, the connection will exist to the degree the actor 
believably recreates human behavior and emotion and 
communicates it through stage business and textual clarity.  
This difference notwithstanding, in law and with 
Shakespeare, the judge and actor are themselves the ultimate 
conduit connecting the text to life. 
A cautionary parallel to note between soft textualism and 
Shakespearean interpretation, however, is that a similar 
experience arises when interpretations strain too mightily 
against the text.  In theatre, sometimes an abstract 
interpretation of Shakespeare’s language leads to startling 
effects and insights.94  More often than not, one feels the 
actors, designers, and all involved struggling upstream 
against the powerful current of Shakespeare’s language.  
Even with interpretations that do not aim at high concept but 
simply impose, for example, the North-South conflict of the 
 
 93.  Although actors, for the most part, do not feel particularly constrained by 
authorial intent, there are authors whose intent is taken very seriously.  David Mamet 
and Samuel Beckett’s estate, for example, exercise a great deal of control over the 
manner of interpretation of their works and, probably not coincidentally, have some 
specific intent behind every comma written.  These authors have specific intentions 
about what in life they mean to mirror.  See, e.g., Jason Zinoman, Guided by Beckett 
from the Grave, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2008, http://theater.nytimes.com/2008/01/ 
02/theater/02shaw.html?_r=0.  Conversely, other playwrights acknowledge that they do 
not know everything that their writing ends up communicating.  That is, they may have 
no specific intent.  See, e.g., Sarah Lyall, Still Pinteresque, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/07/movies/07lyal.html?pagewanted=all (quoting 
Harold Pinter saying, “I don’t make judgments about my own work, and I don’t analyze 
it; I just let it happen”).  With Shakespeare, the interpretation is much more likely to 
spring from the text than from any intent Shakespeare might have had when he wrote 
it four-hundred years ago.  However, this state of affairs might be different if we had 
any direct evidence of his intent external to his texts, like letters or journals. 
 94.  I speculate that among the reasons Peter Brook’s 1970 staging of Midsummer 
Night’s Dream was so revolutionary is that because it was set on an all-white stage 
with trapezes, juggling, and other circus trappings, the text was illuminated in 
startling and unpredictable ways.  See Clive Barnes, Historic Staging of “Dream”, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 28, 1970, available at http://www.alanhoward.org.uk/dreamnytimes.htm.  
But see RON ROSENBAUM, THE SHAKESPEARE WARS: CLASHING SCHOLARS, PUBLIC 
FIASCOES, PALACE COUPS 11 (2006) (“I’ve come to believe, on the contrary, that what 
made it so thrilling was not the way in which Brook’s Dream was new but rather the 
way it was radically old.  The way in which it seemed to capture what one imagines was 
the excitement of the moment the play was first produced four centuries ago.”) 
(emphasis in original).  Rosenbaum’s insight suggests that though the production 
concept was abstract, the interpretation released a creative vitality within the spoken 
text. 
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Civil War era upon the familial conflict of Romeo and Juliet, 
the result is usually that Shakespeare reveals more about the 
Civil War than the Civil War reveals about Romeo and Juliet.  
Shakespearean text speaks to truths larger than any one era 
is likely to illuminate and the text becomes confined rather 
than enlarged.  Worse, it becomes an obstacle the production’s 
concept must overcome and the audience feels the strain of 
the effort.  The consequence of this strain is that the 
interpretation loses its power to persuade.  Similarly, 
interpretations of statutes that strain against the text as 
written impose a similar strain upon the reader seeking the 
justification of the decision.95 
With this caution in mind, we will look to other sources for 
insight as to which choice will best serve our interpretation of 
Caliban.96  Because the soft textualist looks to legislative 
history, I will subsume a closer examination of the soft 
textualist approach into the discussion of the use of legislative 
history in general.  As we shall see, much of the specific 
discussion of Caliban’s line must pause once more for a more 
general discussion of the similarities between Shakespearean 
and statutory interpretation. 
II: INTENTIONALISM AND THE ROLE OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 
As John Barton says, speaking of Shakespearean text: 
“[L]anguage doesn’t exist in a vacuum but is a response to a 
situation and an attempt to work on that situation.”97  
Shakespeare, like the characters he wrote, needed the 
language he chose to communicate his characters’ 
intentions,98 just as statutory text is the language the 
 
 95.  See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892).  For a 
textualist critique of Holy Trinity, see SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 18–23. 
 96.  When the statute is ambiguous, consider legislative history.  See Landsgraf v. 
USI Film Products, 511 U.S. 244, 273 (1994). 
 97.  BARTON, supra note 4, at 70. 
 98.  Although a Shakespearean character should probably never be understood as 
speaking for Shakespeare, that character’s intent nonetheless does go hand in hand 
with Shakespeare’s.  Thus, Polonius says to his son Laertes before sending him back to 
France: “This above all, to thine own self be true.”  HAMLET, supra note 69, at act 1 sc. 
3.  Whether Shakespeare expresses his own philosophy in this line is less important 
than the fact that Shakespeare has put those words in the mouth of Polonius rather 
than, for example, Hamlet, Claudius, or Gertrude.  In other words, never forget that 
this piece of “wisdom” is dispensed by one who manipulates everyone with whom he 
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legislature needs to reach consensus on the proper way to 
address a specific problem.  For the intentionalist legal actor, 
the text is important in the search for statutory meaning, but 
Congress’s intention is the chief concern.  Thus, intentionalist 
judges often consult a statute’s legislative history to discover 
Congress’s will.  As Justice Breyer puts it, “[T]he Framers 
created the Constitution’s complex governmental mechanism 
in order better to translate public will, determined through 
collective deliberation, into sound public policy.  The courts 
constitute a part of that mechanism.”99  The translation of 
another’s will, rather than pure textual analysis, lies at the 
heart of intentionalism. 
Generally, intentionalism breaks down into three further 
approaches each with its own conceptual problems and 
advantages: specific intent, imaginative reconstruction, and 
purposivism.100  Both specific intent and imaginative 
reconstruction seek to find legislative intent at a lower level of 
generality than purposivism.  Specific intent asks how 
Congress actually felt about a “particular issue of statutory 
scope or application” and imaginative reconstruction asks 
“what the legislators would have decided had they thought 
about the [specific] issue[.]”101  Purposivism, on the other 
hand, is broader in scope. 
[It] allow[s] context to determine the level of generality at which 
[the statute’s purpose may be described]  . . . legislative history [is 
examined], often closely, in the hope that the history will help [the 
judge] better understand the context, the enacting legislators’ 
objectives, and ultimately the statute’s purpose.  At the heart of a 
purpose-based approach stands the “reasonable member of 
Congress.”102 
Leaving aside some of the more specific problems 
 
comes in contact and who plans to have his own son spied upon.  See id. at act 2 sc. 1.  
Thus, Shakespeare’s intent is best understood as the character’s intent as revealed 
through the text.  There are situations, however, where even what we, in the twenty-
first century, perceive a Shakespearean character to intend might be very different 
from what Shakespeare himself thought he was writing.  See, e.g., MERCHANT OF 
VENICE, supra note 68; SHREW, supra note 86.  I take this discussion up further in Part 
III. 
 99.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 101 (emphasis added). 
 100.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 222; Paul E. McGreal, A Constitutional 
Defense of Legislative History, 13 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 1267, 1272–73 (2004-2005). 
 101.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 222. 
 102.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 87–88. 
UFFELMAN_CALIBAN’S GRACE 1/31/2013  5:21 PM 
98 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1 
 
presented by each different approach to intentionalism, 
determining a legislature’s intent shares two general 
difficulties with determining Shakespeare’s intent103: the 
aggregation problem and the attribution problem.  These two 
problems are distinct, but connected and worth exploring 
before looking at the benefits of intentionalism. 
A. The Problems with Intentionalism: Aggregation, 
Attribution, and a Judge’s Normative Preferences 
The aggregation problem in the statutory context is that 
majorities of both the House and Senate had to agree to the 
statutory language, and the President had to sign off on it.104  
Each legal actor in this process may have had very different 
intentions in passing the bill, and determining an intention 
that they all shared is deeply problematic.105  Relatedly, the 
attribution problem encompasses concerns such as which 
legislator’s intent should control,106 how much weight should 
be given to malleable reports and statements made in heated 
debates, and the fact that “evidence of actual intent might 
itself be subject to varying interpretations.”107  In 
Shakespearean interpretation, the aggregation and 
attribution problems are similarly intertwined. 
One might guess that in the case of a single author, like 
 
 103.  I note that the literary world, rather than the theatrical world, is the locus of 
the vast majority of issues related to Shakespeare’s actual intent.  See ROSENBAUM, 
supra note 94, at xiv (“The question of whether we have two Lears and three Hamlets 
has provoked a veritable civil war among Shakespeare scholars over the past three 
decades, the resolution—or irresolution—of which can mean all the difference in the 
world to how we view two of the foundational works of Western culture.”). 
 104.  Provided, of course, that the President did not veto the bill, in which case a 
supermajority would have been needed.  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
 105.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 224; ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, 
at 16; Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 
17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994) (“Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive 
for a collective body.”  (citing Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: 
Legislative Intent As Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239 (1992))). 
 106.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 224–25.  These commentators note that 
invoking legislative intent at all “may place too much weight on reports subject to 
manipulation and statements made in the course of heated, phony, or strategic 
debates.”  Id. at 224. 
 107.  See id. at 224–25 (2d ed. 2006).  These commentators note that even if one 
were to try to focus on the intentions of “pivotal” legislators “it’s not always easy to 
figure out who were the pivotal legislators and what were their sincere preferences, 
which are bound to be conflicting and hard to aggregate.”  Id. 
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Shakespeare, these problems would be, at the very least, 
substantially diminished.  One would be wrong.  The 
difficulties begin with the fact that we have none of 
Shakespeare’s personal manuscripts of the plays.  Indeed, for 
the Shakespearean interpreter, this fact and the fact that 
Shakespeare did not leave any other writings that might 
illuminate his authorial intentions compound intentionalist 
problems. 
Our sources for the plays themselves reduce to only “[two] 
printed texts . . . the quarto editions of single plays published 
prior to the folio collection of 1623, and the edition of the folio 
collection itself.”108  The authority of any play in these early 
editions depends on which of two sources was used for 
printing.109  Most theatrical companies of the late sixteenth 
century and early seventeenth century kept two copies in 
their archives: the author’s “foul papers,” which contained 
last-minute corrections, and the “fair copy,” which was the 
cleaned-up version used as a prompt book and used for future 
revivals.110  A problem for the researcher is that “[i]t is not to 
be supposed that these two manuscript categories are always 
readily distinguishable.”111 
The question of authoritativeness is further muddied by 
the fact that, after two of Shakespeare’s surviving co-
members in The Lord Chamberlain’s Men, John Heminge and 
Henry Condell, had gathered what they considered to be 
authoritative copies of the plays to be published in the Folio of 
1623,112 they claimed that earlier distributions of the plays 
were stolen, maimed, and lacked authority.113  However, 
subsequent scholars have since learned that Heminge and 
Condell used some of those same versions in their 
submissions to the five compositors for typesetting, thus 
casting their claim into doubt.114  Thus, to the degree that one 
can make distinctions as to which of these sources might 
 
 108.  Alfred Harbage, General Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE: THE 
COMPLETE WORKS 40 (Pelican 1969). 
 109.  Id. 
 110.  See id. at 40, 41. 
 111.  Id. at 40. 
 112.  Doug Moston, Introduction to THE FIRST FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE xix (Applause 
Books 1995). 
 113.  See ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 35. 
 114.  Id. at 36; see also Moston, supra note 112, at xix. 
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carry greater authoritative weight than others, the inquiry 
begins to resemble the question of which piece of legislative 
history one should find most persuasive: committee reports, 
explanatory statements by sponsors, and so forth.115  
Additionally, the typesetters to whom these texts were given, 
in turn, made many errors,116 as did the proofreaders.117  No 
matter how authoritative the sources for the Folio, they “were 
likely to undergo a certain amount of alteration.”118 
Further, just as legislative reports are subject to 
malleability,119 so modern Shakespearean editors have 
historically played a significant role in what we are presented 
with as representing Shakespeare’s text.  Editors make 
changes in typography, spelling, punctuation, verse lineage, 
and words.120  When dealing with a line of text then, are we 
dealing with Shakespeare’s intention, the intention of those 
who compiled the quartos, Heminge’s and Condell’s, the 
typesetter’s, or the intention of a modern editor who attempts 
to make the text more understandable?  Which of these 
modern editors is more persuasive? 
Before examining the benefits of using legislative history 
in textual analysis, let us look briefly at how these problems 
play out in an actual case of statutory interpretation.  In 
short, two justices looking at the same legislative history can 
arrive at very different conclusions.  In United Steel Workers 
 
 115.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 310–17 (discussing the “hierarchy” of 
legislative sources). 
 116.  Moston, supra note 112, at xx. 
 117.  Id. Moston is somewhat forgiving of the proofreader, noting that “[t]he 
inevitable danger inherent in proofing a writer who himself coined some 1700 words is 
obvious.”  Id. at xx–xxi. 
 118.  Id. at xxi (quoting Charlton Hinman, THE NORTON FACSIMILE, THE FIRST 
FOLIO OF SHAKESPEARE xx (W.W. Norton & Company 1968)).  Compare this to the 
problem of scrivener’s errors.  See supra note 49. 
 119.  See Daniel Engber, What’s in the Congressional Record? Anything your 
congressman wants,” SLATE (Nov. 21, 2005 6:12 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/ 
news_and_politics/explainer/2005/11/whats_in_the_congressional_record.html 
(outlining various ways congressmen can insert material not heard on the floor into the 
Congressional Record). 
 120.  Moston, supra note 112, at xiii; see also Ann Thompson & Neil Taylor, 
Introduction to WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET 91 (Ann Thompson & Neil Taylor eds., 
Arden Shakespeare 2006) (Noting that most editions of Hamlet publish some 
combination of the Second Quarto and First Folio).  Thompson and Taylor’s discussion 
of its different versions suggests that there probably is no such thing as an 
“authoritative” text of Hamlet.  See id. at 74–94. 
UFELMAN_CALIBAN’S GRACE 1/31/2013  5:21 PM 
2013] Caliban’s Grace 101 
 
v. Weber121 the Court confronted the question of whether an 
affirmative action program designed to remedy 
underrepresentation of minorities among craft workers 
violated Title VII’s rule that employers cannot “discriminate 
against any individual” because of “race.”122  Justice Brennan, 
writing for the majority, consulted the legislative history and 
determined that Congress’s intent was to bring minority 
workers into the workforce by opening opportunities to them.  
Congress therefore did not intend to prohibit affirmative 
action programs that would accomplish this goal.123  Writing 
in dissent, Justice Rehnquist also consulted the legislative 
history of Title VII and determined that, Congress, in fact, 
intended to eliminate employment decisions based on race.  
The affirmative action program therefore, clearly violated 
that intention.124  What does not get acknowledged in their 
disagreement is that Congress may well have had both these 
intentions (and others) and they might be reconcilable.125  
Perhaps the subtler view of their disagreement is that 
Justices Brennan and Rehnquist simply balance these 
interests differently and therefore see different means to 
Congress’s end. 
As different statutory actors may read differing intents 
from the same legislative history and different means 
intended to accomplish those ends, different Shakespearean 
actors may find differing intentions in a character and 
different ways of accomplishing those intentions.  The need to 
reconcile competing interests in legislative purposes finds a 
parallel in our struggle with Caliban.  Shakespeare must 
have had a number of intentions for this character.  On the 
one hand, he is a comic character. His plot to kill Prospero is 
aided by a drunkard and a fool, turning his otherwise dark 
purpose into an opportunity for ridiculousness.  On the other 
hand, Shakespeare gives him a powerful back story and puts 
some of the most moving poetry of the play into his mouth.  
The idea of Caliban clearly stimulated something more than 
 
 121.  443 U.S. 193 (1979).  Eskridge, Frickey, and Garrett use Weber extensively to 
illustrate a variety of strengths and weaknesses of intentionalist and soft textualist 
approaches to statutory interpretation in ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 221–35. 
 122.  United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 197 (1979). 
 123.  Id. at 201–04. 
 124.  Id. at 230–54 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 125.  See, e.g., infra, text accompanying note 160–162. 
UFFELMAN_CALIBAN’S GRACE 1/31/2013  5:21 PM 
102 Seton Hall Journal of Sports and Entertainment Law [Vol. 23.1 
 
comedy in Shakespeare’s artistic sensibilities.  How to 
balance those competing interests will depend on the 
sensibilities of each actor who tackles the part. Indeed, how 
the actor balances those interests may determine their 
answer to the meaning of “grace.”  If Caliban is no more than 
comic relief, deciding he needs to forgive Prospero may not 
make any sense. 
On another level, even if actors agree on a character’s 
intention, the means to achieve that intention may vary 
enough to create very different impressions.  Two actors may 
agree that Richard III threatens, deceives, and cajoles various 
characters throughout the play to get what he wants,126 but 
how each individual actor plays these actions will be different. 
In other words, there may be different ways of threatening, 
deceiving, cajoling, and so forth, even within the strictures of 
the text and circumstances.  Thus, one rarely sees two highly 
skilled actors give similar performances of the same 
Shakespearean character.127 
All of which reveals yet a further problem with the use of 
legislative history: “application [of legislative purpose] will 
depend heavily upon context and the interpreter’s 
perspective.”128  In other words, how each individual judge 
sees the statutory question in the first instance shapes the 
lens through which they view the already controversial 
legislative history.  For Justice Rehnquist, the question the 
court was to decide was “should voluntary quotas be allowed 
in hiring?”129  Justice Brennan, on the other hand, saw the 
question as “if the low numbers of minorities in the work force 
 
 126.  See generally RICHARD III, supra note 58. 
 127.  Compare LAWRENCE OLIVIER, ON ACTING 114–30 (1988) (discussing his 
interpretation of Richard III), with SHER, supra note 9 (detailing the evolution of his 
interpretation of Richard III).  In contrast to statutory interpretation where the rule of 
precedent exerts a controlling effect on interpretation, most actors deliberately avoid 
copying another actor’s interpretations of a character.  See id. at 28, 35, 37–38, 67, 97, 
135, 176 (showing examples of Sher’s obsession with Lawrence Olivier’s interpretation 
of Richard III and his determination to avoid any hint of Olivier in his performance); cf. 
ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 49 (“When successive applications of the statute 
occur in contexts not anticipated by its authors, the statute’s meaning evolves beyond 
original expectations.”) (emphasis in original).  For instance, Church of the Holy Trinity 
v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), which has undergone sever scrutiny in modern 
times, see, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 18–23 had no dissenters in 1892. 
 128.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 230. 
 129.  See United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 221–22 (1979) (Rehnquist, 
J., dissenting). 
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are due to ongoing discrimination, should employers be 
allowed to voluntarily prefer minority workers to remedy the 
situation?”130  The different perspectives and normative goals 
of the Justices in framing the question influenced their 
ultimate opinions as to which legislative intent was 
controlling.  How one frames the question in the first instance 
and from what perspective one asks shapes the result. 
B. The Benefits of Intentionalism and Comparison of 
Shakespearean Texts 
What, then, are the benefits to the Shakespearean actor of 
a “legislative” inquiry into Shakespeare’s intent?  With 
statutes, intentionalism’s best claim to legitimacy is that it 
“advances democracy by carrying out the will of the elected 
legislators.”131  A fundamental assumption of intentionalism is 
that the text alone may not contain the entire will of 
Congress.  They might have used inappropriate language to 
deal with the evil they sought to remedy; they might not have 
considered the specific problem before the court; and 
foreseeing all possible fact patterns that the language might 
encompass is impossible.132  Thus, consulting legislative 
history is required to carry out the people’s will as enacted 
through their democratically elected officials.133 
 
 130.  See id. at 197.  I am grateful to Professor Chai Feldblum, Georgetown 
University, for pointing out this contrast to me and for her thoughtful analysis of the 
Justices’ statutory interpretation in Weber in general.  Eskridge, Frickey, and Garret 
also make this point about the difference between Justices Rehnquist’s and Brennan’s 
formulation of the question and discuss more thoroughly its implications to their 
resulting interpretations of Title VII.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 227. 
 131.  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 14. 
 132.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 85–86. 
 133.  As noted, when judges consider legislative history, Justice Scalia finds a 
tension between what he considers judicial lawmaking and democracy.  See Amy 
Gutmann, Introduction to A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE 
LAW ix (1997).  To the extent that Justice Scalia’s concern centers on judicial 
lawmaking supplanting the constitutional grant of legislative authority, see supra, note 
41, I find this concern puzzling in at least one respect: the interpretive act alone 
changes that which is interpreted.  Simply by resolving ambiguity through either text 
or legislative history, judges create meaning—and therefore, law—that was not present 
before.  Thus, to say that textualism avoids judicial lawmaking appears problematic. 
Even if we argue that of all interpretive postures textualism best avoids judicial 
lawmaking, other problems emerge to challenge us.  For instance, determining that the 
text is “plain” or that Congress’s intent is clearly expressed therein with any degree of 
certainty may not always be persuasive.  Thus, as Justice Stevens has noted rejecting 
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Stated another way, looking at legislative history 
illuminates the policy questions the legislators attempted to 
address.  This, in turn, allows the statutory interpreter to 
understand the specific factual circumstances he faces in the 
light of what the democratically elected representatives were 
trying to achieve.  As Weber demonstrates, this inquiry does 
not guarantee a uniformity of results.  However, the analysis 
and dialogue between Justices Rehnquist and Brennan does 
unearth a significant policy challenge equality efforts face: 
what is the best way to achieve equality?  Once the Court 
gives its interpretation and discusses and challenges the 
given justifications, the public emerges with a deeper 
understanding of the problem and, ideally, a richer dialogue 
may begin.134  If Justices Rehnquist and Brennan in Weber 
had been actors interpreting Caliban, we would be grateful for 
two different yet compelling pictures of the character.  Both 
are drawn from the text, both find justification in legislative 
intent, and both are intertwined with the legislature’s policy 
considerations.  Their dispute, in effect, centers more on 
policy than on text. 
The most analogous policy questions the Shakespearean 
interpreter faces is how to make Shakespeare’s characters 
 
the notion that the Court should only consult legislative history when the text is 
ambiguous, “It would be wiser to acknowledge that it is always appropriate to consider 
all available evidence of Congress’ true intent when interpreting its work product.”  
Koons Buick v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 65 (2004) (Stevens, J., joined by Breyer, J., 
concurring).  Or, in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, “Where the mind labours to 
discover the design of the legislature, it seizes every thing from which aid can be 
derived.”  United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch 358, 386 (1805). 
In contrast to the expectation that interpretation merely reveals that which is inherent 
in the text, when the Shakespearean actor interprets Shakespeare’s text, the audience 
expects maybe even demandsthat something new be revealed, even if that 
something is simply a deeper understanding.  That something might have been present 
in the text, but until the actor illuminates it—that is, chooses it as a result of the 
research and investigation he has done—that something did not exist concretely for the 
audience.  If determining meaning is equivalent to creating law, then for the 
Shakespearean actor, a theatrical analogue to Justice Scalia’s concern does not exist. 
 134.  In this regard, the dialogue between Justices Rehnquist and Brennan could 
almost be likened to a play by George Bernard Shaw.  Among Shaw’s particular talents 
was the ability to take two competing intellectual, political, or policy-based ideas, 
embody them in characters, and then place those characters in dramatic circumstances 
where they must confront each other and the contradictions inherent in their positions.  
See,.e.g., GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, CANDIDA; GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, MAJOR 
BARBARA. 
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relevant to a twenty-first century audience.135  As we shall see 
in Part III, with characters like Shylock, Kate, and Caliban, 
policy arguments are especially important.  In these 
instances, looking to the origins of the texts’ creation proves 
crucial both to what those policy questions involve as well as 
to fully understanding the text.  However, such an inquiry can 
also illuminate more discrete questions about the text’s 
meaning and character’s moment to moment intentions.  In 
other words, the inquiry uncovers the sorts of questions the 
interpreter should be asking. 
Let us, then, examine some of the benefits of a 
Shakespearean actor’s “legislative” inquiry.  Just as a court 
might compare a bill as it was first proposed and subsequent 
proposed changes with the enacted statute in the search for 
legislative intent,136 Shakespearean actors find illumination 
by comparing texts extant from the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century with modern editors’ versions of 
Shakespeare’s plays.  Many of Shakespeare’s textual 
questions cannot be appreciated—and therefore capitalized 
upon—by mere perusal of one editor’s version of 
Shakespeare’s plays.  To fully appreciate them, one must 
consult sources closer to Shakespeare himself.  Consulting 
these sources, like consulting legislative history, roots these 
issues out and can point to what the proper answer (or 
question) should be.137 
 
 135.  Another policy question might involve the degree to which a particular actor 
views the text as the principal driver of interpretation.  Antony Sher has indicated that 
for certain roles at least, the need for theatricality should be a concern at least as 
important as the text.  See SHER, supra note 9, at 181.  Thus, a tension might arise as a 
matter of “policy” when one’s choice for theatricality comes in tension with what the 
text can support. 
 136.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kelly, 58 N.E. 691, 691 (Mass. 1900) (“As the act is 
printed in Pub.St. c. 100, § 9, and in the second supplement of the General Statutes, 
published in 1878, and in St.1885, c. 90, there is a semicolon after the word “morning,” 
although when the original act was first published the point used was a comma.”).  This 
court found the change evidence of Congress’s intent that the rule of the last antecedent 
should control the interpretation of the statute.  See also supra, note 78 & 79 and 
accompanying text. 
 137.  Ron Rosenbaum quotes Philip Edwards, editor of the New Cambridge Hamlet, 
and what he says with regard to Shakespeare, seems equally applicable to the 
consultation of legislative history: “Everyone who wants to understand Hamlet, as 
reader, actor or director, needs to understand the nature of the play’s textual questions 
and to have his or her own view of the questions in order to approach the ambiguities in 
the meaning.”  ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 30 (emphasis added). 
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Indeed, the answers to these questions may have a 
profound impact upon the meaning of a character or even the 
whole play.  For example, Hamlet’s speech “How all occasions 
do inform against me, / And spur my dull revenge!”138 is 
present in the Good Quarto version of 1604, but absent from 
the First Folio, published in 1623.139  As Rosenbaum says, “To 
lose (or add) thirty-five of Hamlet’s most self-lacerating 
lines—about ‘thinking too precisely,’ the end point of his 
introspection, a self-consciousness about self-consciousness—
is not inconsiderable.”140  In another example, late in Hamlet, 
Laertes is bent on killing Hamlet for killing Polonius 
(Laertes’s father).  While plotting with Claudius, Laertes 
learns that Hamlet has returned to Denmark and says: 
It warms the very sickness in my heart 
That I shall live and tell him to his teeth 
“Thus didst thou.”141 
The 1623 version has the last line as “Thus didest thou” 
and the 1604 Good Quarto has it as “Thus didst thou.”142  The 
Bad Quarto has it simply as “Thus he dies.”143  However, 
Harold Jenkins, a respected editor, believes that 
Shakespeare’s actual intent was that the line should read 
“Thus diest thou.”144  Given an actor’s pragmatic approach to 
interpretation, these versions not only lead to very different 
readings of Laertes, but also lead one to see the force of “Thus 
diest thou” in performance: it is clearer and packs a greater 
emotional punch.145 
Of perhaps even greater moment, King Lear’s final line is 
 
 138.  HAMLET supra note 69, at act 4, sc. 4. 
 139.  ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 32. 
 140.  Id. at 32. 
 141.  HAMLET, supra note 69, at act 4, sc. 7. 
 142.  See ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 29. 
 143.  See id. at 34. 
 144.  Id. at 29.  Jenkins bases this on the idea that the Bad Quarto was a 
reconstruction of something heard in performance.  If what one has heard is “Thus dies 
thou” one is more likely to remember it as “Thus he dies.”  Jenkins has thus combined 
these texts to arrive at what he believes was Shakespeare’s specific intent.  Id. at 33–
34.  For a good overview of the debate over the three texts of Hamlet and whether the 
changes involved represent Shakespeare’s or someone else’s revisions, see id. at 29–
101. 
 145.  Indeed, this was the line used in Kenneth Branagh’s film of Hamlet.  See 
Hamlet (Castle Rock Entertainment 1996). 
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currently in dispute.146  The 1623 Folio has Lear, after 
carrying Cordelia’s corpse onto the stage, cradling her in his 
arms, utter: “Do you see this? Look on her! Look her lips, / 
Look there, look there.”147  Perhaps, in his dying breath, Lear 
believes he sees Cordelia breathe.  His last line could either 
be a vision of redemptive hope, or the last crushing delusion 
of a foolish old man.148  The 1608 Good Quarto, on the other 
hand, gives a line traditionally thought to be Kent’s to Lear 
following his “Look there”: “Break, heart, I prithee break.”149  
This version presents a vision of unrelieved suffering.150  
Which text we choose will have a resounding impact not only 
on our interpretation of Lear’s dying (and possibly most 
important) moment, but also on the play as a whole. 
Thus, despite the difficulties determining Shakespeare’s 
actual, specific intent in any given instance, considering the 
history of its drafting nevertheless may shed light on textual 
meaning and illuminate the direction in which Shakespeare 
desired the actor to proceed.  Such illumination can only aid 
the interpretation and the production as a whole.  In the 
statutory context, even if two interpretations clash as they did 
in Weber, the policy question at issue may crystallize in such 
a way as to be of use to a future legislature.  The argument 
may prompt Congress to take the specific question up in the 
same way that a rigorous textualist reading of a statute 
might, while at the same time potentially serving those 
Congress meant to help.  Whether textualist or intentionalist, 
the judge’s interpretation plays a role in effecting or blocking 
congressional intent.  Without wanting to minimize the 
legitimate objections new textualists have to intentionalism, 
to suggest that the judge can somehow remain outside that 
policy conversation, to me, seems highly questionable.  As 
such, the judge that makes a good faith effort to effect 
congressional intent appears to be in the least objectionable 
posture. 
Unfortunately, consulting the folio of 1623 reveals little 
that may be of help in our inquiry into “grace.”  The only clue 
 
 146.  For a good discussion and overview of this scholarly debate, see ROSENBAUM, 
supra note 94, at 114–54. 
 147.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, KING LEAR act 5, sc. 3. 
 148.  ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 115–16. 
 149.  Id. at 114–15. 
 150.  Id. at 114–15. 
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to the actor lies in the fact that the folio line is “Ile be wife 
hereafter, / And [s]eeke for grace.”151  The fact that the word 
“[s]eeke” is spelled with an additional “e” on the end suggests 
that Shakespeare intended the word to be given more 
emphasis than we might give it today.152  Such an emphasis 
might hint that Caliban has hitherto either waited for grace 
to fall upon him as the “sounds and sweet airs” of the island 
have been wont to do,153 or that he has not even considered 
the idea until now.  However, coming before a caesura, “grace” 
is more likely to be the operative word and the one the actor 
would wish to emphasize.  This textual clue therefore would 
enrich the actor’s imaginative life, perhaps lead to other 
discoveries about Caliban’s journey earlier in the play, or 
enhance his understanding of the role as a whole, but not 
provide substantial insight into Caliban’s intention in this 
particular moment. 
Because the “legislative history” of The Tempest casts no 
light on our inquiry we might, again, consider ourselves done.  
We have found nothing to suggest that Caliban’s seeking 
Prospero’s forgiveness is absurd or counter to Shakespeare’s 
intent.  Given the textual evidence we uncovered in Part I, 
even the intentionalist interpreter might conclude that the 
inquiry should go no further.  However, we interpret a text 
over 400 years old and, if it is to be more than a museum 
piece, we must make our interpretation relevant to our lives 
today.  To do this we must go beyond the author’s intent. 
III: DYNAMIC THEORIES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
Justice Breyer presents a conundrum for the judge that 
parallels the situation in which a Shakespearean actor often 
finds himself.  Justice Breyer notes that the purpose, 
language, structure, and history of a statute, “without more, 
may simply limit the universe of possible answers without 
clearly identifying a final choice.  What then?”154  For both 
statutory and Shakespearean interpreters, the world of 
 
 151.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 5, sc. 1 in THE FIRST FOLIO OF 
SHAKESPEARE 1623 18–19 (Applause Books 1995). 
 152.  Elizabethan spelling was often a matter of how words sounded.  Moston, supra 
note 112, at xlv. 
 153.  THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 3, sc. 2. 
 154.  BREYER, supra note 5, at 86. 
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possible interpretive answers must sometimes open wider 
than the text and its author’s intentions would otherwise 
allow.  Indeed, in contrast to the more restricting approach of 
asking what a text meant when it was written, 
Shakespearean interpreters almost always must ask how the 
plays speak to us today.  This need often demands what the 
statutory interpreter might call a dynamic posture to 
interpretation. 
A. Three Dynamic Theories and their Justifications 
Dynamic theories recognize, like the Shakespearean 
interpreter, that prudential or pragmatic concerns should be 
allowed to shade a text’s meaning.  Eskridge, Frickey, and 
Garrett identify at least three different dynamic theories of 
statutory interpretation that merit comparison to a 
Shakespearean actor’s approach: best answer theories, 
pragmatic theories, and critical theories.155  Let us briefly 
state these theories and their problems so we have a general 
understanding of what drives the dynamic interpreter as well 
as the theoretical challenges they face. 
Best Answer Theories.  Best answer theories suggest that 
laws should be interpreted “to produce an ‘optimal state of 
affairs,’ which can be found by construing them ‘in light of the 
purposes that they may best be made to serve,’ rather than 
‘the intentions which legislators had in drafting them.’”156  
This theory reflects the modern actor’s approach: in light of 
all other considerations, how does the play best speak to us 
today and how does the interpretation of the character best 
suit the production?  Parallel concerns for rule of law, 
democracy, and predictability—problems for the best answer 
theorist157—do not trouble the Shakespearean actor.  Quite 
the opposite: uncovering a fresh and unexpected approach to 
the character is a highly desirable result. 
Pragmatic Theories.  Pragmatic theories recognize and 
attempt to account for the complexity of human belief and 
decision making.  “[O]ur intellectual framework is not single-
 
 155.  See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 245–56. 
 156.  Id. at 247 (quoting Heidi Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99 YALE L.J. 945, 1028 
& n.177 (1990)). 
 157.  See id. at 247. 
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minded, but consists of a ‘web of beliefs,’ interconnected but 
reflecting different understandings and values.”158  Thus, 
pragmatic theories “look to multiple goals for statutory 
interpretation and insist on considering multiple sources.”159  
For example, in contrast to Justices Brennan and Rehnquist 
discussed in Weber, Justice Burger in Griggs v. Duke Power, 
believed that “[t]he objective of Congress in the enactment of 
Title VII was to achieve equality of employment opportunities 
and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor 
an identifiable group of white employees over other 
employees.”160  He arrived at this conclusion by examining 
“the integrative purpose of Title VII . . . the evolution of the 
statute, and the best answer, in light of the country’s sorry 
record of pushing people of color to the bottom.”161  Justice 
Burger’s approach mirrors the actor’s practical and holistic 
approach to the search for meaning.  Just as the 
Shakespearean actor must weigh the needs of his character, 
the needs of the play, and the needs of the production to 
arrive at an interpretive answer that will best serve all, so too 
the pragmatic statutory interpreter “consider[s] several 
values, and the strength of each in the context at hand, before 
reaching a decision.”162  The resulting interpretation does not 
simply draw a line of logic connecting the dots one after 
another, but rather, like an artist, presents us with a picture 
filled with shading and nuance.163 
Critical Theories.  Critical theories tend to focus on the 
subjective perspective or experience of the writer in question.  
These theories “deconstruct[] statutory texts, typically in 
order to show how particular readings are ideologically rather 
than objectively grounded.”164  The idea is, in part, to pave the 
way for new interpretive possibilities by revealing the 
limitations of the author’s perspective.  As Eskridge, Frickey, 
 
 158.  Id. at 249. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  401 U.S. 424, 429–30 (1971). 
 161.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 251. 
 162.  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 55. 
 163.  Put another way, “[The] reasoning should not form a chain which is no 
stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, 
provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected.”  Id. at 55-56 
(quoting 5 Charles Peirce, Collected Papers ¶ 264 (Hartshorne & Weiss eds. 1960)). 
 164.  ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 4, at 252 n.62. 
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and Garrett observe, “Why should a provision put in to satisfy 
objectives of white conservatives not be read from the 
perspective of people of color?”165  The interpretive posture of 
the critical theorist is particularly vital to the Shakespearean 
actor approaching plays such as Merchant of Venice and The 
Tempest.  Jewish people occupied a significantly different 
place in Elizabethan England than they do in modern 
England or America, and the actor playing Shylock who 
ignores Shakespeare’s possible biases does so at his peril.  
Similarly, as we shall see, Shakespeare’s view of Caliban was 
likely far different from our modern view, which has been 
influenced by our understanding of American colonialism. 
Taken as a whole, dynamic theories recognize the 
complexity of real world, human decision making.  They 
attempt to account for the possible subjective preferences of 
the decision maker and broaden his perspective.  By contrast, 
an approach that insists on only one lens through which to see 
a question, ignores the inherent subjectivity of the exercise.  
Worse, it pretends that subjectivity does not exist in the name 
of objectivity. 
Crucially, dynamic theories share an implicit or explicit 
recognition of changed circumstances.  As we shall see, the 
recognition of changed circumstances is particularly relevant 
to Shakespearean interpretation.  In the statutory context, 
Eskridge notes that 
[S]tatutes begin to evolve from the moment people start applying 
them to concrete problems.  Over time that statutory evolution 
becomes ever more striking because the world changes, often as a 
result of the statute itself. . . . 
At the level of society and culture, changed circumstances 
include new understandings about individual, group, or 
institutional behavior; revised professional consensus or 
popular mores; and fresh factual information or intellectual 
paradigms.166 
An excellent example of an unspoken dynamic 
 
 165.  Id. at 252 (referencing United Steel Workers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193 (1979)). 
 166.  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 52–53.  Note that “Hermeneutics 
suggests that statutory interpretation . . . involves an interaction between interpreter 
and text that creates new and perhaps unexpected meaning over time. . . . [H]ermeutics 
posits that statutory meaning is constructed, not discovered, by the interpreter.”  Id. at 
62. 
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interpretation of a regulation occurred in Braschi v. Stahl.167  
A man who was the tenant in a rent-controlled New York City 
apartment had died and his same-sex “permanent life 
partner” who lived with him sued for the right to continue to 
occupy the apartment.  The New York City Rent and Eviction 
Regulations stated that a landlord could not evict him under 
these conditions if he was a member of the dead tenant’s 
“family.”168  The court ruled in favor of the partner finding 
that the meaning of the word “family” should “find its 
foundation in the reality of family life.”169  In support of its 
decision, the court found that 1) the appellant and his partner 
had lived together as permanent life partners for more than 
ten years; 2) they regarded one another, and were regarded by 
friends and family, as spouses; 3) the two men’s families were 
aware of the nature of the relationship; 4) they regularly 
visited each other’s families and attended family functions 
together, as a couple; and 5) he continued to maintain a 
relationship with his lover’s niece, who considered him an 
uncle.170  This result is surely the consequence of changed 
circumstances.  To suggest that legislators inthe 1940’s, when 
sodomy was against the law,171 intended “family” to 
encompass a man’s gay lover would surely be absurd.172 
However, if the use of legislative history is controversial, 
allowing considerations outside the statutory text or 
legislative history to inform the analysis will often be that 
much more problematic.173  Indeed, dynamic theories are all 
particularly vulnerable to attacks based on rule of law and 
democracy concerns.174  Responding to the democracy 
 
 167.  74 N.Y.2d 201 (1989). 
 168.  See 9 N.Y.C.R.R. 2204.6(d). 
 169.  Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 74 N.Y.2d at 208–12. 
 170.  Id. at 213. 
 171.  See People v. Onofre, 415 N.E.2d 936 (1980) (striking down as unconstitutional 
New York’s Penal Law, § 130.38, which had its origins in a law dating back to 1886). 
 172.  I am grateful to Professor Timothy Westmoreland, Georgetown University Law 
Center, for this insight.  But see Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 191 (1976) (Stevens, 
J., concurring) (finding that although the Congress that passed the Civil Rights Act of 
1866 would not have intended it to prohibit private racial discrimination, the prevailing 
sense of justice today and the policy of the Nation accord with this construction). 
 173.  Justice Scalia mockingly characterizes the dynamic approach to statutory 
interpretation: “The law means what it ought to mean.”  SCALIA, supra note 5, at 22 
(reviewing ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21). 
 174.  Indeed, William N. Eskridge, Jr., a chief proponent of dynamic theories, 
acknowledges that he can offer no “normative theory for dynamic interpretation that 
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concerns, Eskridge and others assert that “consent and 
process are not the only ways to look at law’s legitimacy.”175  
Substantive, rather than procedural justifications should 
equally drive our obedience to the law.176  Eskridge proposes a 
theory of statutory interpretation whose application is 
analogous to Shakespearean interpretation: critical 
pragmatism.177  Like the pragmatic modern actor, critical 
pragmatism asserts that “we can figure out what works best 
in specific cases even without a general theory of what 
works. . . . No single legal convention governs statutory 
interpretation, but all are relevant—statutory text, legislative 
intent or purpose, the best answer.”178  Eskridge is also 
careful to note the difference between critical pragmatism and 
mere pragmatism. 
I am in the exceptional case open to statutory interpretations that 
press beyond or criticize existing conventions and traditions.  For if 
law’s legitimacy is not mechanically established by a rule’s pedigree 
or its process of formulation, the interpreter has a grave 
responsibility to reestablish the productivity of law every time she 
construes a statute.179 
This notion, from a Shakespearean actor’s point of view, is 
appealing because it corresponds to the actor’s responsibility 
on stage.  The actor is not simply free to do with a character 
whatever he wants.  Scrupulous and exacting care must be 
paid to the text and its meaning, and interpretations that 
stray beyond the text’s bounds must have a sound reason for 
 
satisfies” either of these criteria.  See ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 175. 
 175.  Id. at 174.  “Let us transport ourselves into a hypothetical country that, in a 
democratic way, practices the persecution of Christians, the burning of witches, and the 
slaughtering of Jews.  We should certainly not approve of these practices on the ground 
that they have been decided on according to the rules of democratic procedure.”  Id. 
(quoting JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM, AND DEMOCRACY, 242 
(1961)). 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  Eskridge also notes the strengths and weaknesses of various other substantive 
or “normative” theories that might drive statutory interpretation, including natural 
law, which “asserts . . . that a statute is not law unless it is consistent with larger moral 
precepts,” dialogic theory like feminist and republican theories that “assert that law’s 
legitimacy rests on norms that are derived from dialogue among diverse groups in a 
society,” and postmodernism which “challenges the interpreter to be eclectic, tolerant, 
and nondogmatic in understanding law’s practice” because of  “skepticism about an 
objective rule of law and majority-based statutory applications.”  Id. at 175. 
 178.  Id. at 200. 
 179.  Id. at 201 (emphasis added). 
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doing so if they are to gain acceptance by an audience. 
Changed circumstances, among all the motivations driving 
dynamic theories of statutory interpretation, is perhaps most 
relevant to the interpretation of Shakespeare in general and 
Caliban in particular.  I will therefore look at three 
Shakespearean characters for which this inquiry is 
particularly relevant, concluding with Caliban. 
B. Changed Circumstances and Shakespeare 
Shakespeare poses a paradox with regard to changing 
circumstances.  Shakespeare’s texts speak to universal truths 
about human needs, wants, and behavior.  On the one hand, 
because these truths are “universal,” they are unchanging.  
They speak to us today on the same fundamental level as they 
spoke to audiences in the late sixteenth century to early 
seventeenth century.  The fiery heat of youthful passion given 
life in Romeo and Juliet is as relevant and true now as then.  
On the other hand, Shakespeare’s texts have also changed 
because attitudes and social mores have shifted and 
transformed over four centuries.  Further, “London play goers 
of 1596–97 would have included many who jibed at Dr. 
Roderigo Lopez, the Christianized Portuguese Jew and royal 
physician, who . . . was convicted on doubtful evidence of 
plotting to poison Queen Elizabeth.”180  We might, however, 
hesitate in rushing to accuse Shakespeare of anti-Semitism.181 
Not only did Shakespeare substantially humanize Shylock, 
but he also concealed his own attitudes in favor of his 
characters—a skill at which he is better than many authors.  
Shakespeare does not reveal his personal attitudes in his 
plays.  The character is all.  Given the lack of personal 
writings, what Shakespeare thought or felt is pure 
speculation.  However, given the time period in which he 
wrote, Shakespeare could have intended Shylock to be the 
object of ridicule.  However, in light of the Holocaust, evolving 
cultural attitudes, and increased sensitivity to cultural 
 
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Notably, Shakespeare made his Elizabethan audience hear Shylock say as a 
response to the many abuses he has suffered at the hands of the Christians, “Hath not 
a Jew eyes?  Hath not a Jew hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, 
passions? . . . If you prick us, do we not bleed?”  MERCHANT OF VENICE, supra note 68, 
at act 3, sc. 1. 
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differences in general, such a reading of Shylock today is all 
but unthinkable.  Though the historical arguments 
supporting Shakespeare’s anti-Semitism may be persuasive, if 
we are to produce The Merchant of Venice for today’s 
audience, we must go beyond the historical context and find 
what remains in the text that may be of value.182 
Kate in Taming of the Shrew presents a similar case.  At 
the end of the play, her husband Petruchio makes a bet with 
two other recently married men that of their three wives, only 
Katherine will come to him from another room when he calls 
for her.  The first two husbands respectively “bid” and 
“entreat” their wives to come, but are refused.  Petruchio then 
“command[s]” Kate to come to him and she complies.183  
Petruchio then has Kate “tell these headstrong women / What 
duty they do owe their lords and husbands.”184  Kate replies 
with a speech that, on its face, confirms the superiority of the 
husband and the subservience of the wife.185  In the 
Elizabethan world, the supremacy of the husband would 
hardly have been questioned (at least openly).  Indeed, there 
was one tradition of entertainment in the Elizabethan world 
 
 182.  Note, however, that there are those who feel the play should never be 
produced.  See ROSENBAUM, supra note 94, at 291 (“James Bowman, former editor of 
TLS reviewing in The New York Sun, . . . said [the Al Pacino 2006 film of Merchant of 
Venice] convinced him that Merchant was just no longer playable.”).  
 183.  SHREW, supra note 86, at act 5, sc. 2. 
 184.  Id. at act 5, sc. 2. 
185.   Fie, fie, unknit that threat’ning unkind brow 
And dart not scornful glances from those eyes 
To wound thy lord, they king, they governor. . . . 
Thy husband is thy lord, thy life, thy keeper, 
Thy head, they sovereign; one that cares for thee 
And for they maintenance; commits his body 
To painful labor both by sea and land, 
To watch the night in storms, the day in cold, 
Whilst thou lie’st warm at home, secure and safe; 
And craves no other tribute at thy hands 
But love, fair looks and true obedience— 
Too little payment for so great a debt. . . . 
Then vail your stomachs, for it is no boot, 
And place your hands below your husbands foot, 
In token of which duty, if he please, 
My hand is ready, may it do him ease. 
Id. at act 5, sc. 2.  At this point, the actress generally places her foot on the floor to 
allow Petruchio to step on her foot if he so desires.  How Petruchio responds speaks 
volumes about the relationship they arrive at by the end of the play. 
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that involved a husband seeking to tame his shrewish wife 
with extreme Grand Guignol violence.186  Though 
Shakespeare adopted the basic situation of this tradition, he 
did not overtly adopt its brutally, physically abusive methods 
(though with twenty-first century eyes, you would probably 
still interpret what he does to Kate as abuse).  Instead, he 
chose the more humanist tradition of the husband leading the 
wife “gently but firmly, to accept his rightful authority, much 
as he would teach a colt to go through its paces or a hawk to 
fly to the lure.”187  In this light, the meaning of Kate’s speech 
seems plain on its face and is amply supported by whatever 
“legislative history” we might choose to explore.  However, in 
view of the Women’s Rights movement and our evolving 
understandings of the historical repression of women (and, 
indeed, of spousal abuse), the modern reader sees this speech 
in a very different light than her Elizabethan counterpart.188  
Therefore, how to interpret the speech presents choices to the 
modern actor not available to the Elizabethan actor.189 
Shylock and Kate are the most obvious examples of 
changed circumstances in Shakespeare.  But Caliban has also 
undergone a sea change in the twentieth century.  For years 
the theatrical tradition had been to play Caliban as some 
variation of a monster.190 Textually, Shakespeare has both 
 
 186.  See Alfred Harbage, Introduction to THE TAMING OF THE SHREW in WILLIAM 
SHAKESPEARE: THE COMPLETE WORKS 80 (Pelican 1969) (discussing the anonymous 
Elizabethan ballad, A Merry Jest of a Shrewd and Curst Wife Lapped in Morel’s Skin 
for Her Good Behavior (printed about 1550)). 
 187.  See id. 
 188.  Though not necessarily.  When I taught this speech to students across the 
country, I was surprised to hear the number of men and women (young high school 
students no less) who believed that Kate hits the nail on the head.  We have even heard 
similar views expressed by the public in relation to the Democratic presidential 
campaign between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton.  See, e.g., Katharine Q. Seelye, 
Clinton-Obama Quandry for Many Black Women, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2007, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/14/us/politics/14carolina.html?pagewanted=all (“‘A 
man is supposed to be the head,’ she said. ‘I feel like the Lord has put man first, and I 
believe in the Bible.’”). 
 189.  For a fascinating discussion of several late twentieth century actresses 
discussing their experiences interpreting Katherine, see CLAMOROUS VOICES, supra 
note 13, at 2–25. 
 190.  See Alden T. Vaughan, Shakespeare’s Indian: The Americanization of Caliban, 
39 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY 137, 138 (Summer 1988) (“[Caliban] evolved generally 
and gradually from a drunken beast in the late seventeenth century, to a fishy monster 
in the eighteenth, to an apish missing link in the nineteenth.”).  We cannot be sure how 
Shakespeare’s audience saw Caliban because accounts do not exist to report. However, 
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Trinculo and Stephano call Caliban “monster” throughout the 
play.191  He is also referred to as a “fish,”192 “a villain,”193 
“beast,”194 “devil, a born devil,”195 “thing of darkness,”196 and 
“misshapen.”197  When David Suchet first undertook the part 
at the Royal Shakespearean Company in 1978 and told others 
he was to play Caliban, they asked: “‘How are you going to 
play him?’, or ‘Are you going to wear a special skin like a fish 
and have scales and fins?’”198 
What spurred Suchet to investigate Caliban’s physical 
shape more closely was the following textual sequence: 
Prospero:  Then was this island— 
  Save for the son that she did litter here, 
  A freckled whelp, hag-born—not honored with 
  A human shape. 
Ariel: Yes, Caliban her son. 
Prospero: Dull thing, I say so: he, that Caliban 
  Whom now I keep in service.199 
One could interpret the sequence as follows: Prospero is 
describing Caliban as a “freckled whelp, hag born” and “not 
honored with / A human shape,” at which point, Ariel 
interrupts his train of thought, and Prospero lashes out at 
him for it.  The phrase “not honored with / A human shape” 
could be therefore taken to apply to Caliban, and one could 
 
the above account suggests that Shakespeare’s audience probably did not see a 
substantially different Caliban than the audience of the Restoration.  For a full history 
of evolving interpretations of Caliban discussing text, literary criticism, and 
performance, see VAUGHAN, supra note 62 at 23. 
 191.  See, e.g., THE TEMPEST supra note 26, at act 3, sc. 2. 
 192.  Id. at act 2, sc. 2. 
 193.  Id. at act 1, sc. 2. 
 194.  Id. at act 4, sc. 1. 
 195.  Id. at act 4, sc. 1. 
 196.  Id. at act 5, sc. 1. 
 197.  THE TEMPEST supra note 26, at act 5, sc. 1. 
 198.  PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 1, supra note 13, at 167.  This also reveals the way 
stare decisis plays a role in acting Shakespeare.  When characters are interpreted the 
same way for a long time, the expectation that the next actor will follow suit can exert a 
powerful influence on those who seek to interpret the roles themselves as well as on the 
audience.  See generally supra note 127 discussing the role of precedent in acting. 
 199.  PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 1, supra note 13, at 167. 
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easily see how the traditional approach to Caliban was 
justified.  Suchet, however, noted that in all editions he 
consulted, including the folio of 1623, that in Prospero’s line 
Then was this i[s]land 
(Saue for the Son, that she did littour heere, 
A freklld whelpe, hag-borne) not honour’d with 
A humane [s]hape.200 
the parenthesis indicate that the line means the island 
was not honored with a human shape except for Caliban’s.201  
He also noted that Trinculo says, upon first encountering 
Caliban that he has “fins like arms”202 and not “arms like 
fins.”  Coupled with Caliban’s song where he sings “No more 
dams I’ll make for fish . . . nor scrape trenchering, nor wash 
dish.”203  With the realization that Caliban could not perform 
these chores if he had fins for arms, Suchet became convinced 
that Caliban was human shaped.204  Suchet gradually came 
around to a view that had been gaining acceptance in 
scholarly circles since the early twentieth century, but that 
 
 200.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TEMPEST act 1, sc. 2 in THE FIRST FOLIO OF 
SHAKESPEARE 1623 4 (Applause Books 1995); cf. THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 1, 
sc. 2. 
 201.  PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 1, supra note 13, at 170.  Worth noting is that some 
versions use parentheses and some use “M” dashes.  See, e.g., William Shakespeare, 
The Tempest, act 1, sc. 2, available at http://www.shakespeare-literature.com/ 
The_Tempest/2.html (using “M” dashes).  Arguably, catching this meaning is easier 
when the phrase is set off by parentheses than by “M” dashes.  To the degree that is 
true, consulting the folio or “legislative history” here would potentially reveal this new 
interpretation to the actor whose performance edition sets it off with dashes.  In 
Suchet’s case, we see that Shakespeare’s “legislative history” can also be used to 
confirm textual clues, much as courts often say that their textual analysis is confirmed 
when they consult the legislative history.  See, e.g., American Federation of Musicians 
v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 176 (1964) (“Whatever doubts may be left by sole and 
plenary reliance on plain meaning are fully resolved by consideration of the legislative 
history behind § 101(a)(3) (B) and of other provisions of the [Labor-Management 
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959].”).  This also raises a point about how normative 
choices can inhibit one’s ability to find relevant meaning.  Once we posit Caliban’s 
human shape, the text reveals a wealth of clues supporting that hypothesis.  See 
VAUGHAN, supra note 62, at 7–20 (detailing textual and structural support for Caliban’s 
human shape).  But the assumption had been otherwise for so long that these textual 
clues remained hidden. 
 202.  THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 2, sc. 2. 
 203.  Id. at act 2, sc. 2.  Both these refer essentially to washing dishes. 
 204.  PLAYERS OF SHAKESPEARE 1, supra note 13, at 170–72. 
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had not yet found its way into the theatre: that Caliban and 
The Tempest as a whole had its inspiration in a 1609 
shipwreck of Sea Venture where the crew miraculously 
survived in Bermuda.205  Caliban is therefore not a monster, 
but a native, “natural” man who, to Shakespeare, would have 
seemed exotic and strange, but would, nonetheless, resonate 
with Elizabethan audiences who, by the early seventeenth 
century, had become somewhat familiar with accounts of 
native, “uncivilized” peoples. Suchet’s performance of Caliban 
was a “composite of the Third World Native, a generalized 
conception of primitive man.”206  He arrived at this 
interpretation by close textual examination and comparison of 
extant texts (Shakespeare’s legislative history) all seen 
through the lens of his own modern perspective. 
Finally, circumstances have changed with regard to the 
way actors approach acting in general.  The impact of Freud 
and modern psychology has certainly had an impact on actors 
as they sought over the course of the twentieth century to 
further understand psychological complexity in the characters 
they play.207  My own experience with acting Caliban208 was 
that when I spoke the line “I’ll be wise hereafter, / and seek 
for grace” with the intention of asking for forgiveness, this 
intention did not feel right.209  Prospero has never forgiven 
 
 205.  See Vaughan, Americanization, supra note 190, at 137.  Note that the themes 
of colonialization and anti-slavery had begun to shape performances of Caliban as early 
as 1934, but even in these performances, Caliban is hairy and scaly.  See VAUGHAN, 
supra note 62, at 189.  Note, however, that there were no natives on Bermuda, id. at 43 
(citations omitted), so although this might have inspired the storm and shipwreck in 
The Tempest, this event alone could not have been a direct source for Caliban.  In the 
view of these authors, Shakespeare’s source for Caliban cannot be reduced to any one 
historical event or literary text.  Id. at 274.  What seems as likely as any possibility is 
that, as an artist, he was influenced by a variety of sources that played on his 
imagination to create an amalgam that best suited his purpose. 
 206.  Virginia Mason Vaughan, “Something Rich and Strange”: Caliban’s Theatrical 
Metamorphosis, 36 SHAKESPEARE QUARTERLY 390, 403 (Winter 1985). 
 207.  Credit for this revolution in the acting approach is usually given to Constantin 
Stanislavski and three books he published in particular: AN ACTOR PREPARES (1918), 
BUILDING A CHARACTER (1918), and CREATING A ROLE (1918); cf. supra note 30 and 
accompanying text (noting changes in the legal approach to interpreting law). 
 208.  I played the role for The Acting Company in their 1998–99 tour as part of their 
repertoire mounted exclusively for schools. 
 209.  Here, the position of Stanley Fish becomes particularly relevant.  To a large 
extent, the interpretive choices I made as an actor were unquestionably partly the 
result of my own experience as an educated, liberal man committed to egalitarian 
values in the late 20th century.  See generally FISH, supra note 1.  See also ESKRIDGE, 
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Caliban for what he believes was an attempted rape of 
Miranda and treats him accordingly.210  Indeed, Caliban’s fear 
of Prospero is as evident as his hatred.211  Given the wrongs 
done to Caliban and my understanding of the lingering effects 
of abuse, it did not seem believable to me that Caliban, his 
bitterness and rage already inflamed, could so quickly 
overcome the vengeful feelings that had driven him 
throughout the play and which had probably eaten away at 
him for years before.  Caliban seemed intelligent and 
imaginative enough to me to recognize the potential value of 
the opposite choice; that forgiveness might ultimately benefit 
him more than allowing resentment to fester in him long after 
Prospero is gone.  Thus, weighing the text, Shakespeare’s 
interest in the redemptive power of forgiveness in general, 
and changed circumstances, to me, “grace” came to mean “the 
capacity to forgive.” 
My conclusion (which others may surely disagree with) 
was informed both by the text and by the interpretation of 
Suchet and others who saw through a textual presumption 
that had dominated the interpretation of Caliban for 
centuries.  Because of Suchet’s careful attention to the text 
and his desire to see the character with more complexity, the 
play as a whole has been transformed.  Yet this 
transformation has not stretched the plain meaning of the 
text into a shape it will not bear.  On the contrary, the text 
itself contains ample justification for this more complex view 
of the character.  As a result, the door has been opened to 
interpreters who wish to continue to add flesh to the bones of 
Shakespeare’s text as conditions continue to change.  
Importantly, as in Braschi v. Stahl, the text is served and so 
is the audience who wishes to see a play with continued 
 
DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 58 (“[Hermeneutics recognizes that] the interpreter’s 
understanding is also a historically situated event. . . . an interpreter of a different time 
or culture from the author’s may have a vastly different interpretation of the same 
written text.”). 
 210.  See, e.g., THE TEMPEST, supra note 26, at act 1, sc. 2 (Caliban to Prospero: “ . . .  
here you sty me / In this hard rock, whiles you do keep from me / The rest o’ the 
island.”). 
 211.  When Caliban first encounters Stephano, a drunken butler, he mistakes him 
for one of Prospero’s spirits sent to torment him and begs and pleads pitifully for mercy.  
See id. at act 2, sc. 2.  At the end, when Caliban realizes that Prospero knew of 
Caliban’s murderous plot all along, Caliban says, “I shall be pinch’d to death.”  Id. at 
act 5, sc. 1. 
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relevance in the twenty-first century. 
CONCLUSION 
In the end, what the Shakespearean and the legal actor 
must share is intoxication for the plasticity of language.  The 
lawyer arguing before a court must, like the Shakespearean 
actor, see the range of possibilities language and text present 
in order to determine the argument that will best serve the 
client’s interest.  The judge, like the Shakespearean actor, 
must make the final decision as to the statute’s meaning that 
she will communicate to the public.  The tools each 
interpretive actor uses are strikingly similar; one might even 
go so far as to say intuitive.  We all go through a similar 
process when attempting to ascertain a text’s meaning: plain 
meaning, context, dictionaries, evidence as to speaker’s 
intent, etc.  The differences between the two interpretive 
endeavors have less to do with the tools we use, and almost 
entirely to do with our feelings about judicial discretion.  This 
is undoubtedly why so much ink has been spilled over the use 
of legislative history. 
Until very recently, law firms and lawyers were not only 
experts in a given field, they were also one of the main 
repositories of the law.  Lawyers benefitted from the mystique 
that surrounded this inaccessibility and could profit from the 
perception that legal training gave them specialized insight 
beyond the ken of the non-lawyer into how to the read the 
law.  That perception will change. 
With the explosion of the Internet, the law is increasingly 
available and free to all.  Though the lay person may not have 
learned the legal terms we have given to the tools of statutory 
interpretation, he or she is certainly capable of coming to a 
reasonable conclusion as to their plain meaning.  Further, the 
idea that context and authorial intent might play a role in 
what words mean is neither new nor exclusive to law.  I do 
not suggest that legal training does not confer valuable 
expertise, but clients will soon discover that statutory 
interpretation is not as mysterious as lawyers might like to 
think.  Rather than continue to try to convince the public and 
ourselves that what lawyers do is an inaccessible science, it 
may prove beneficial to understand that what we do is an 
interpretive art. 
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Statutory interpretation is not a science, whatever the 
defenders of new textualism may say.212  Calling statutory 
interpretation a science rather than an art harkens back to 
the fiction that some objective, identifiable truth is 
discoverable in a piece of text.  However, significant 
differences separate science and the interpretive act.  
Critically, in statutory interpretation, there are the facts, 
there is the law, and there is the judge’s opinion or analysis 
regarding their interaction. A scientist, on the other hand, 
may interpret the results of an experiment.  Those results 
may be flawed and disproven by subsequent experimental 
results, but the interpretation is not the result itself.  Insofar 
as scientists are more highly regarded for intellectual rigor 
than artists, and this assertion may elevate the interpreter’s 
status in the eyes of the public, it undermines the law’s 
legitimacy when results reached by a “scientific” analysis are 
less than convincing.213  At its most extreme, the new 
textualist approach is akin to asserting that acting 
Shakespeare can be reduced to a few mechanical rules that, if 
followed, will produce a moving performance.  The argument 
that reduces art to a mathematical formula obfuscates the 
discretion inherent in textual interpretation and is contrary 
to the goals of legal transparency in decision making. 
Shakespearean actors, like most judges, recognize text as 
the essential source of meaning.  Like most judges, 
Shakespearean actors feel their search for textual meaning is 
 
 212.  See, e.g., SCALIA, supra note 5, at 3, 14.  This is not to say a valid comparison 
cannot be made, but I maintain that statutory interpretation is far more art than 
science and calling it an art is less misleading.  We may say that a law is tested in the 
laboratories of experience and the courts, but the actual process of that testing is an 
interpretive act rather than anything that takes place in a laboratory. 
 213.  The “statutory interpreter as scientist” stance allows the interpreter to suggest 
that statutory interpretation requires the most sophisticated, rigorous, intellectual gaze 
to penetrate textual secrets, while simultaneously concealing this intimation behind the 
fiction that no judicial discretion is involved and that the judge simply calls balls and 
strikes. Cf. ROY M. MERSKY & TOBE LIEBERT, THE U.S. SUPREME COURT HEARINGS AND 
REPORTS ON SUCCESSFUL AND UNSUCCESSFUL NOMINATION OF SUPREME COURT 
JUSTICIES BY THE SENATIVE JUDICIARY COMM. 20, 55 (2006) (using this metaphor as a 
way of stating that, as a judge, he has no agenda or platform, but simply applies the 
law to facts).  This position may well be an ideal to aspire to, but I have questioned 
whether it is possible to achieve—at least in the hard cases.  Cf. Jonathan Uffelman, 
Comment, Hamlet Was a Law Student: A “Dramatic” Look at Emotion’s Effect on 
Analogical Reasoning, 96 GEO. L. REV. 1725, 1754–56 (2008) (discussing the difficulty of 
arriving at decisions dictated by pure logic in the common law context). 
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constrained by pragmatism.  Because textualism can 
constrain judicial discretion, looking beyond the text has the 
added benefit of increasing the range of possibilities of 
meaning for the judge, thereby narrowing the range of 
potential conflict.  The clearer the picture one has of the text 
to be interpreted, the more likely one is to affect the 
legislature’s intent in a way that maintains consistency with 
the written text.  Thus one may maintain a commitment to 
textualism without viewing it as a hammer.214  At best, 
theories of interpretation provide a lens through which to 
view hard questions rather than any concrete determination 
thereof.  Consequently, the tools legal actors use begin to look 
like those of a Shakespearean actor.  The tools may reveal, 
limit, expand, and shade possible meanings, but in hard 
cases, they rarely yield a clearly authoritative answer or 
interpretation.  In the end, the interpretation the public 
receives is the partly reasoned, partly intuitive, possibly 
artistic choice of a highly trained legal actor. 
 
 
 214.  William Eskridge, speaking of his dynamic model for statutory interpretation, 
could be speaking of an actor struggling with Shakespearean text: “[T]he statutory 
interpreter’s understanding of the plain meaning of a statutory text depends on her 
understanding the whole story of the statute, including its historical circumstances and 
its evolution, which themselves cannot be understood without reference to the statute’s 
plain meaning.”  ESKRIDGE, DYNAMIC, supra note 21, at 64. 
